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The Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda's
Restorative Dispute Resolution Response
To The 1994 Genocide
Jessica Raper
"There is an urgent need for national reconciliation in Rwanda, but this must not
be at the expense ofjustice, otherwise the opposite effect will be produced and
the murderers reinstated."
-Alain Destexhel
At the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Rwanda re-
mains faced with the social and legal challenge of resolving the same conflict.
Justice Richard J. Goldstone has examined how truth commissions and tribunals
are helping to bring peace and stability worldwide. He noted that, "justice can
be a useful tool for peace-keeping or peace building. With it, countries emerg-
ing from periods of serious human rights violations can hope for an enduring
peace. Without it, the terrible rate of war crimes will not abate." 2 Justice Gold-
stone describes the options for a country attempting to recover from a period of
lawlessness that has spawned violence and crime.3 According to Justice Gold-
stone, a country's options are to: (1) grant a blanket immunity from prosecution
for past criminal acts; (2) allow a regular justice system to operate and ordinary
courts to try and sentence anyone proven guilty of criminal conduct; (3) estab-
lish a truth and reconciliation commission or its equivalent in order to enable
confessions of guilt for past human rights abuses to be traded for indemnifica-
tion; or (4) establish a modified truth commission under which the most serious
offenders remain subject to prosecution.4
Since its rise to power in July of 1994, the Rwandan government has been
committed to prosecuting all those accused of genocide. To prosecute the ap-
proximately 130,000 defendants, Rwanda has adopted a program called gacaca
1. Alain Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century 63 (1995).
2. Richard J. Goldstone, Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions and Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 485, 501 (1996). Justice Goldstone is
the first Chief Prosecutor for the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals and former head of the South
African Commission of Inquiry into Political Violence and Intimidation.
3. See id. at 492.
4. Id.
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(pronounced ga-cha-cha), based on Rwanda's traditional customary dispute
resolution system.5 The gacaca law provides, as suggested by Justice Goldstone
as noted above, a reconciliation component that allows defendants to trade con-
fessions of past genocide crimes for indemnification, as well as a prosecution
component that holds the most serious offenders accountable in a Western-style
prosecution in a formal court of law.6 One of the main goals of gacaca is to end
the so-called "culture of impunity" that has developed as a result of generations
of cultural division between the Hutus and Tutsis.7
International media attention has focused largely on crimes committed dur-
ing the killing spree that began on April 6, 1994, when "the daily killing rate
was at least five times that of the Nazi death camps."8 However, the Rwandan
government has committed to resolving numerous other problems, including:
mistrust of the government, ethnic division, and the pervasive fear engendered
by the persecution and pogroms preceding and culminating in the genocide of
1994 and the decades of endemic social disorder that preceded the wave of vio-
lence.9
RWANDA'S SocIAL HISTORY
The 1994 genocide spawned international outcry, while the historic distinc-
tions between the Hutu and Tutsi remain frequently misrepresented in the me-
dia. 0 As the journalist Fergal Keane stated, at the time of the genocide, "[t]he
general consensus among those of us watching the pictures and those who had
taken them was that Rwanda was a madhouse, a primitive torture chamber
where rival tribes were busy settling ancient scores."" To understand the 1994
genocide and why gacaca has been chosen as a method for punishment of
Rwandans and reconciliation in Rwanda, it is necessary to have an understand-
ing of Rwanda's true social history. 2
5. Speech of Dr. Zac Nsenga, Ambassador of the Republic of Rwanda to the United States,
given at Georgetown University on November 11, 2004 (hereinafter "Nsenga Speech"), quoting
Organic Law No. 8/96 of August 30, 1996, on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses Consti-
tuting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 1990,
available at http://preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm (hereinafter "Organic Law No.
8/96"). The statute entered into force on September 1, 1996. Id.
6. Organic Law 8/96, supra note 5.
7. Nsenga Speech, supra note 5.
8. Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 261 (1995).
9. Nsenga Speech, supra note 5.
10. FERGAL KEANE, SEASON OF BLOOD: A RWANDAN JOURNEY 6-8 (1995).
11. Id. at 6.
12. Nsenga Speech, supra note 5.
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RWANDA'S SOCIAL GROUPS
The earliest documented Rwandan inhabitants are thought to be ancestors of
today's Twa. 3 Some researchers have posited that the Twa's ancestors were
supplanted by Bantu-speaking farmer-traders known as Hums, who arrived be-
fore the Tutsi and gradually forced the Twa from some of their traditional hunt-
ing land and deeper into the forests.14 The Tutsi, a generally taller, slimmer
people than the Hutus or Twa, may have arrived later, around 1400 A.D. 5
Some theories hold that the Tutsi arrived from lands north of Rwanda, gradually
assimilated and took control before rising to the top of the Rwandan social struc-
ture and eventually, through conquest and an appeal to divine right, took over
the position of king and his court. 16 However, more recent theorists hypothesize
that the Hutus and the Tutsis are descendants of people who began farming in
Rwanda around 1,500 to 2,000 years ago. 7
The history of the division between the Rwandan ethnic groups is undocu-
mented in writing." As Alain Destexhe writes in Rwanda and Genocide in the
Twentieth Century,
One thing is certain, the massacres in Rwanda are not the result of a deep-rooted and ancient
hatred between two ethnic groups. In fact, the Hutu and Tutsi cannot even correctly be de-
scribed as ethnic groups for they both speak the same language and respect the same tradi-
tions and taboos. It would be extremely difficult to find any kind of cultural or folkloric cus-
tom that was specifically Hutu or Tutsi. There were certainly distinguishable social catego-
ries in existence before the arrival of the colonisers, but the differences between them were
not based on ethnic or racial divisions. 19
Membership in the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa groups involved an occupational iden-
tity rather than an ethnic connotation. 0 Oral tradition documents a patron-client
13. Leo J. DeSouza, Assigning Blame in Rwanda, WASH. MONTHLY (Sept. 1997), reprinted in
AFRICA, OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 101 (William Dudley, ed., 2000). See also JOHN READER, AFRICA:
A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CONTINENT 617 (1997). Because the Twa are such a small percentage of the
population and as a result exert less influence in the Rwandan conflict, mention of this group is
confined to items of general interest. This Note does not intend to fully treat the Twa experience.
14. READER, supra note 13, at 617.
15. DeSouza, supra note 13, at 101. See also RICHARD F. NYROP, ET AL., RWANDA: A
COUNTRY STUDY 6 (1982).
16. DeSouza, supra note 13, at 101; NYROP, supra note 15, at 6.
17. READER, supra note 13, at 310.
18. See DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 36.
19. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 36. Alain Destexhe was directly involved in the Rwandan
relief effort following the 1994 genocide and was director of Doctors Without Borders International
from 1991 to 1995.
20. Paul E. Nantulya, The Gacaca System in Rwanda, Conflict Trends, No. 4 (2001), avail-
able at http://www.accord.org.za/xt/2001 -4.htm.
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relationship resembling a feudal society: the Tutsi occupied the higher socio-
economic and political positions of that of the feudal lords, while the Hum acted
as the serfs or loyalists of their Tutsi patrons.2 Hutu and Tutsi could change
group membership based on their wealth and status.22 For example, a Hutu who
gained cattle for any reason became a Tutsi, while a Tutsi who lost his cattle for
any reason, including disease or famine, became a Hutu.23 The third Rwandan
group, the Twa, was comprised of forest dwellers.2 4  This group of
pygmy/pygmoid hunter-gatherers became known for their skill in music and
dance at the Tutsi king's court.25 The Twa made their living through making
pottery, hunting and gathering.26
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
Beneath the king, there were three main tiers of governmental organization:
(1) the chieftaincy of war, which oversaw Rwanda's common defense, (2) the
chieftaincy of pasture, which handled pastoral and cattle breeding activities, and
(3) the chieftaincy of land, which oversaw matters concerning farmers and their
land." In keeping with the two groups' social roles, the chiefs of pasture were
predominantly Tutsi, and the chiefs of land were predominantly Hutu. 2' How-
ever, most of the higher-level administrative power was reserved for Tutsis.29
From the fifteenth through the nineteenth centuries, the Tutsi king centralized
the monarchy, reducing the power of Rwandan chiefs.3" However, more distant
areas of the kingdom, especially the Hutu-controlled northwest, were never
brought under complete control, and even became a bastion of Hutu influence in
the decade preceding independence.3'
CULTURAL ORGANIZATION
Prior to colonization, Rwandan society involved a complex system of clans,
language, culture, religion, kinship, governmental organization, and housing, all
21. DeSouza, supra note 13, at 101; NYROP, supra note 15, at 6-7; Nantulya, supra note 20.
22. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 40; Nantulya, supra note 20.
23. Nantulya, supra note 20.
24. NYROP, supra note 15 at 45; Nantulya, supra note 20. The Twa were considered to be
inferiors by both Hutus and Tutsi. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 39.
25. NYROP, supra note 15, at 45-46.
26. Nantulya, supra note 20, at 53.
27. Id.
28. Id. There are, however, historical accounts showing that eighty percent of the chiefs in
northern Rwanda were Hutu.
29. Philip Briggs & Janice Booth, Rwanda: The Bradt Travel Guide 9-10 (2001).
30. NYROP, supra note 15, at 7-8.
31. Id. at8.
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of which combined to define a Rwandan citizen's place in society.32 Each citi-
zen was imbued with a sense of national identity through membership in one of
eighteen clans, all of which were made up of all three classes of Rwandan citi-
zens: Hutus, Tutsis and Twa.33 As historical accounts suggest, Rwandans found
stronger identification with membership in their clan than with membership in
their occupational status group.34 Further, the three groups spoke the same lan-
guage, with only minor local modifications.35 There were also intermarriages,
and there was an absence of state or self-selected segregation between the
groups.
36
As Janice Booth notes,
Since our only source of information about these early days is oral tradition, which by its na-
ture favours the holders of power, we cannot be certain to what extent the power structure
was accepted by those lower down the ladder, to what extent they resented it and to what ex-
tent they were exploited by it. But, whether harsh, benevolent or exploitative (or possibly all
three), it survived, and is what the Europeans found when they entered this previously un-
known country.
37
Although we cannot know with any certainty the true nature of the pre-colonial
power relationship, the fact that there was a national governmental structure and
some semblance of national unity has been used as an educational tool of uniting
today's Rwandan population. 3' But because there was such a strong govern-
mental and social structure, the factors that served to unite pre-colonial Rwanda
formed the basis for the development of the post-genocide gacaca process.
39
DIVISIVE COLONIAL POLITICS
The 1994 genocide resulted in part from colonial policies that developed the
class system into divisions that were characterized as ethnic and racial distinc-
tions.4' Germany colonized Rwanda at the Berlin Conference of 1885, although
it was not until nine years later that the first European traversed Rwanda. 41 The
colonizers used the distinctions between the Hutu and Tutsi social categories
existent in Rwandan society at the time of colonization; they exaggerated stereo-
32. Nantulya, supra note 20, at 53.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. READER, supra note 13, at 617.
36. Nantulya, supra note 20, at 53.
37. See BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 8.
38. Nsenga Speech, supra note 5.
39. Nantulya, supra note 20, at 51.
40. Id.
41. DeSouza, supra note 13, at 101; NYROP, supra note 15, at 9.
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types and pitted the Tutsis against the Hutus to reinforce differences and develop
ethnic distinctions from what had, before that point, been a class system.42
Germany supported the theory that the Tutsi were a superior race.43 Early colo-
nists developed the myth that the Tutsi were "black Aryans" who were more
similar to Europeans than to Africans and could be entrusted with the duties
attendant to colonial rule.' Thus, the German colonialists used the Tutsi popu-
lation for assistance with colonization.45 The German government ruled indi-
rectly through the Tutsi monarchy and supplied military assistance to allow the
king to eliminate the remaining independent Hutu kingdoms.46 The German
government ruled through the reigning Tutsi govemment, which provided effec-
tive control of the country due to the historically well-developed power struc-
ture.
47
Beginning in the early 1900s, German ethnographers reported that three
strikingly different ethnic groups inhabited the areas now comprising Rwanda:
the Twa, the Hutu and the Tutsi. 4' Those studying tribal differences developed a
theory of classification based upon physical characteristics such as skin color,
type of hair, and shape of the skull.49  Reports stated that "[t]he Tutsi were...
tall, handsome, slender, and well-proportioned. The Twa were grotesque little
creatures whom the Germans referred to as dwarfs. Between the two stood the
stocky aboriginal Bantu, the Hutu."5 In a further example, the Duke of Meck-
lenberg noted:
The Watussi are a tall, well-made people. Heights of 1.80, 2.00 and even 2.20 metres are of
quite common occurrence, yet the perfect proportion of their bodies is in no wise detracted
from ...The primitive inhabitants are the Wahutu, an agricultural Bantu tribe, who, one
might say, look after the digging and tilling and arilcultural economy of the country in gen-
eral. They are a medium-sized type of people ....
42. DESTEXE, supra note 1, at 36.
43. Id. at 40. Despite a complete lack of scientific evidence in support of a racial distinction
between the Tutsi and Hutu, German colonizers deemed the Hutu and Tutsi to be different races. Id.
at 39-40.
44. KEANE, supra note 10, at 13.
45. READER, supra note 13, at 617 (citation omitted). It is important to note that not all Tutsi
participated in the ruling class, nor did all Tutsi participate in assisting the German, and later the
Belgian colonization. However, all of the chiefs whom were selected to hold posts in the German
colonial administration were Tutsi. Id. at 618.
46. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 40; NYROP, supra note 15, at 11. It is worth noting that the
Tutsi kings, beginning in the seventeenth century, having systematically eliminated the Hutu kings
and chiefs, may have developed ethnic tensions between the groups. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 40.
47. NYROP, supra note 15, at 10-11; READER, supra note 13, at 617; DeSouza, supra note 13,
at 102.
48. READER, supra note 13, at 617 (citation omitted).
49. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 38.
50. READER, supra note 13, at 617 (citation omitted).
51. BRIGGS & BooTH, supra note 29, at 9 - 10; READER, supra note 13, at 618.
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However, although "anthropologists have since shown that these physical
characteristics are neither so general nor so sharply defined as described by the
German ethnographers, they are persistently cited as fact., 52 As stated by Alain
Destexhe,
So it was that German, and later Belgian, colonisers developed a system of categories for dif-
ferent "tribes" that was largely a function of aesthetic impressions. Individuals were catego-
rised as Hutu or Tutsi according to their degree of beauty, their pride, intelligence and politi-
cal organisation. The colonisers established a distinction between those who did not corre-
spond to the stereotype of a negro (the Tutsi) and those who did (the Hum). The first group,
superior Africans, were designated Hamites or white coloureds who represented a "missing
link" between the Whites and the Blacks. "Any [good] quality attributed to an African group
[was] ... read as a sign of interbreeding with 'non-negro' cultures .... 53
Rwanda's colonial powers and missionaries adopted the theory that the Tutsi
were immigrants and of different genetic stock than the Hutu.54 They justified
favoring Tutsis over Hutus based on the assessment that the Tutsis had superior
political and social organization.55 This assessment was based on the Tutsi cus-
tom, continued by colonizers, and perpetuated by the fact that cattle were owned
by the Tutsi king, who allocated the cattle to other Tutsi chiefs, who in turn
passed along the right to own cattle from father to son.56 This custom ensured
the continuation of Tutsi dominance.57 Another custom signaling Tutsi superi-
ority to the colonizers was the fact that the Tutsi chiefs provided protection to
Hutu farmers in exchange for agricultural produce and labor, effectively forming
a feudal system.5" At the beginning of the twentieth century, colonizers began
to view this class system as a racial division, which led to the practice of deem-
ing the Hutu and Tutsi groups to be races. 9
THE WEAKENING OF THE MONARCHY
While noting that the physical characteristics attributed to the Tutsi and
Hutu were far from universal due to their ability to switch between groups,
Germany was fascinated by the physical characteristics exhibited by each group
52. READER, supra note 13, at 617 (internal citation omitted).
53. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 38 (internal citations omitted).
54. Id. at 39; see also READER, supra note 13, at 617.
55. DESTEXHE, supra note l,at 39; READER, supranote 13, at 617.
56. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 39; READER, supra note 13, at 617.
57. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 39; READER, supra note 13, at 617.
58. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 39-40.
59. Id. at 39.
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and their distinct roles in the Rwandan power structure.6 ° The Duke of Meck-
lenburg was interested in the Tutsi king's level of authority, noting that:
Rwanda is certainly the most interesting country in the German East African Protectorate-in
fact in all Central Africa-chiefly on account of its ethnographical and geographical position.
Its interest is further increased by the fact that it is one of the last negro kingdoms governed
autocratically b' a sovereign sultan, for German supremacy is only recogni[z]ed to a very
limited extent.
Germany's presence remained limited, although it took several important
actions, including institution of a head tax that caused the Hutu to see Germany
as a protector, such as introduction of coffee as a cash crop, thus replacing cattle
as the indicator of wealth and introducing a money economy, and education of a
few Hutu along with the Tutsi who made up the vast majority of parochial
school students. 62  Despite these changes that weakened Tutsi power and the
control exerted by the monarchy and seem significant in retrospect, the German
domination continued to be largely unrecognized.63
Even as late as the beginning of the twentieth century, despite the effects of
German colonial rule and efforts to cultivate divisions between the Hutu and the
Tutsi, the Rwandan groups were best described as a hierarchy of castes main-
tained through the custom of confining marriage to the members of one's own
group or caste. 64 But, a number of factors still served to unite the Tutsi and
Hutu.65 For example, the two groups spoke the same local language (Kinyar-
wanda) shared the same social traditions, lived in the same areas, accepted
mixed marriages, and participated together in military actions against neighbor-
ing kingdoms.66 Furthermore, all Rwandans shared common crafts, taboos,
divinations and medicines; worshipped the same ancestors; and consulted the
same spirit mediums. 67 Another significant tradition that united some Rwan-
dans, regardless of their occupational status as Hutus and Tutsis, was the bond
of the blood vow, taken when two friends drank each other's blood to demon-
strate their commitment to a lifetime bond as family members. 68 As a result of
these types of commonalities, the bonds of Rwandan cultural history remained
stronger than the attempts of colonizers to foster division.69
60. See generally DeSouza, supra note 13, at 102.
61. BRIGGS & BooTH, supra note 29, at 9-10. See also READER, supra note 13, at 618.
62. NYROP, supra note 15, at 11-12; READER, supra note 13, at 634.
63. BRIGGS & BooTH, supra note 29, at 10-11. See also NYROP, supra note 15, at I I-12.
64. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 37.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 37. See also Nantulya, supra note 20.
67. Nantulya, supra note 20.
68. Id.
69. Nsenga Speech, supra note 5; NYROP, supra note 15, at 5.
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BELGIAN COLONIZATION
Belgium took control of Rwanda in 1916.70 Belgium, like Germany, main-
tained control of the colony through the Rwandan monarchy's power structure.71
Belgium strengthened the existing local power imbalances by introducing chief-
doms and sub-chiefdoms to strengthen Tutsi control in customary relationships,
as well as deposing most of the remaining Hutu chiefs.72 However, the Belgian
administration also intended to foster the Hutus' gradual social and economic
progress, declaring that:
[T]he Government should endeavor to maintain and consolidate traditional cadre composed
of the Tutsi ruling class, because of its important qualities, its undeniable intellectual superi-
ority and its ruling potential. However, the mentality of this class must gradually alter. A
way must be sought gradually to modify its conception of authority, which must be changed
from one of domination exercised solely for the benefit of its holders, to one of a more hu-
mane power to be exercised in the interests of the people.
73
To that end, Belgium also undermined the authority of the monarchy, allowing a
lessening in the traditional structures that kept the Hutus in a subservient role,
although Hutus remained second-class citizens.74
In 1931, Belgium deposed Rwandan King Musinga, who proved to be prob-
lematic in Belgium's development plans for Rwanda, and appointed a succes-
sor.75 As Rwandans thought that the king ruled through divine right, the Belgian
government's deportation of the king altered the perception of power in Rwan-
dan society by exposing the myth of divine rule.
76
In 1935, the Belgian government issued each Rwandan an identity card that
listed the citizen's ethnic group based on morphology and level of wealth.77
Citizens were required to carry the card at all times and present it upon de-
mand.78  These cards served to deepen social divisions between the Hut and
Tutsi because they removed the ability for Hutus to elevate to the Tutsi class
70. See generally READER, supra note 13, at 618-21, for a more specific description of the
negotiations leading to the Belgian acquisition of Rwanda after World War I.
71. DeSouza, supra note 13, at 102.
72. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 40; NYROP, supra note 15, at 13.
73. NYROP, supra note 15, at 14-15 (citation omitted).
74. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 11-12; DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 40-43; NYROP,
supra note 15, at 13-17.
75. NYROP, supra note 15, at 13.
76. Id. at 14.
77. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 12-13. These identity cards were still in use at the
time of the 1994 genocide, and were used as a method of determining whom to target for genocide.
Id. at 13. See also DeSouza, supra note 8, at 102.
78. KEANE, supra note 10, at 16.
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through the acquisition of cattle.79 The issuance of identification cards later
proved to be a key factor in the execution of the genocide, both as a tool to tar-
get Tutsis, and as a method of establishing a group identity among those who
committed crimes."0 These cards, in effect, established the creation of the
groups as "other."81
In effect, the identity cards expressed to the Hutu that their lot in life was to
toil, often in servitude, for the rest of their lives with no hope of self-
betterment.8 2 The class divisions fostered by the cards became a self-fulfilling
prophecy in the educational arena, where the Hutus' level of educational attain-
ment mirrored the disparity in social status. 3 The colonizers blamed the dispar-
ity in Tutsi and Hutu education on the Hutus' lack of interest in education.84 In
fact, from 1945 to 1957, less than one-fifth of the students were Hutus in the
Belgian-supported educational system.85 However, the disparity was clearly the
result of widespread discrimination in the colonial school system originally
opened by the Germans. 6 In addition, the disparity was endemic in that the
school system even "had a minimum height requirement which effectively re-
served it for Tutsis. ' s Nevertheless, as the spread of Christianity progressed,
the levels of Hutu educational attainment began to change.88
The Tutsi chiefs who became Christian began to convert their Hutu subor-
dinates.89 The seminaries welcomed these Hutu students more than the classical
education system.90 But, the subsequent denial of positions in the Tutsi gov-
emnment of a group of seminary-educated Hutus led many to later embrace the
theory of ethnic separatism between the Hutus and Tutsis.9" A new generation
of missionaries supported the educated Hutus' protests, linking the movement




83. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 41.
84. Id. at 41. This perception of the Hums' lack of interest in education persisted to a much
later time, as exemplified by the Belgian author, Omer Marchal, who wrote in 1994 that "[t]he
majority of the Tutsi could read, but did not want to vote. The Hum would all have liked to vote, but
only a minority could read. This is the fault of their parents who regarded school as useless, while
the Tutsi pushed to have their children educated." Id. (quoting OMER MARCHAL, PLEURE, 0
RWANDA BIEN-AIMt (1994)).
85. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 12.
86. Id. at 12; DeSouza, supra note 13, at 102.
87. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 12; DeSouza, supra note 13, at 102.
88. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 41.
89. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 41; NYROP supra note 15, at75.
90. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 41; NYROP supra note 15, at75.
91. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 42. It is worth noting that, at this point, Rwanda was consid-
ered to be 65% Christian. Id. Today, Rwanda is around 75% Christian. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra
note 29, at 69; READER, supra note 13, at 635.
10
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with the Catholic Church.9 2 The Tutsis, deprived of both leadership through
divine right and the authority of the Catholic power structure, "began to question
the power of the church and the Belgian authorities."93 Due to the Tutsis' ques-
tioning, the Church suddenly shifted its support to the Hutu cause, which meant
embracing republican ideas that hoped for Hum emancipation.9 4  Thus, the
movement toward equality in the political and social structure began.95
DECOLONIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
As the number of educated Hutus gradually increased, the movement for
Hum rights became stronger, starting in about 1950.96 Some members of the
younger generations of Hums and Tutsis adopted the colonial description of the
ethnic differences between Hutus and Tutsis.97 Although some Tutsis believed
they shared the same ethnic origins with the Hums, others subscribed to the
theory of the Tutsis as superior Hamitic outsiders.98 This distinction led to po-
larization, which extremists later manipulated as a factor in ethnic division. 99
Alain Destexhe described the transformation of political and socialized rela-
tionships between Hum and Tutsi from pre-colonial to post-colonial times in the
following passage:
[Wihat happened in Rwanda illustrate[d] a situation where the coexistence of different social
groups or castes metamorphosed into an ethnic problem with an overwhelmingly racist di-
mension. The caricature of physical stereotypes, although they did not always hold true and
were probably due to the principle of endogamy practised by each group despite the number
of mixed marriages, was manipulated to provide proof of the racial superiority of one group
over the other. Archaic political divisions were progressively transformed into racial ideolo-
gies and repeated outbreaks of violence resulting from the colonial heritage which was ab-
sorbed by local elites who then brought it into the political arena. 100
One Tutsi political group characterized the tension between the Hum and Tutsi,
saying,
92. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 42. Although many missionaries supported the movement for
Hutu rights, the Roman Catholic Vicar Apostolic of Rwanda strongly supported the Belgian decision
to continue support of the Tutsi power structure. Id. at 40-41.
93. Id. at 43.
94. Id.
95. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 42-43.
96. See generally DeSouza, supra note 13, at 102.
97. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 41-42.
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Relations between us and them have forever been based on servitude; therefore, there is no
feeling of fraternity whatsoever between them and us... Since our Kings have conquered all
of the Hutu's lands by killing their monarchs and enslaving their people, how can they now
pretend to be our brothers? 10 t
Although, of course, the German and Belgium colonial governments modi-
fied the political relationships between the Hutu and the Tutsi, at the time of
decolonization, the "single most important fact in [Rwandan] preindependence
history was the domination of the Hutu majority by the Tutsi minority. Two
periods of colonial rule did not basically alter the traditional structure; in fact,
for reasons of expediency, the colonial administrations served to reinforce Tutsi
control." 1
02
The era of decolonization in Africa brought stirrings for independence in
the 1950s.'0 3 In 1957, the High Council of Rwanda, Rwanda's governing body,
called for "rapid preparation" for total independence from Belgium.'" The
ruling Tutsi class sought immediate independence from Belgium, because the
swift pace would allow the existing political power structure to remain intact. 105
As tensions mounted, the Tutsi government tightened control on.the Hutu popu-
lation in an attempt to maintain control after decolonization had occurred.0 6
Meanwhile, Hutu political movements formed to combat abuses.0 7 Some fac-
tions made a bid for power under the premise that the Hutu natives had been
invaded and exploited by Tutsis who had treated the Hutus no better than the
colonials. "'
An ethnic problem developed from the social power imbalance between the
Hutus and the Tutsis.'09 In response to the High Council's call for independ-
ence, nine Rwandan Hutu intellectuals produced a powerful response."' The
document, Bahutu Manifesto (or Manifeste des Bahutu), subtitled A note on the
social aspects of the indigenous racial problem in Rwanda, expressed the first
open opposition to Tutsi social and political domination, and asserted that all
Africans should have greater participation in their own government. "' The
101. DeSouza, supra note 8, at 102-03.
102. NYROP, supra note 15, at 5.
103. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 43.
104. Id. at 17.
105. See DeSouza, supra note 13, at 102.
106. Id. at 103.
107. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 42; NYROP, supra note 15, at 18-19.
108. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 42; NYROP, supra note 15, at 18-19.
109. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 42; NYROP, supra note 15, at 17.
110. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 42; NYROP, supra note 15, at 17.
111. NYROP, supra note 15, at 17; DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 42 (stating the full name of the
unpublished paper); READER, supra note 13, at 635. As stated in LEARTHEN DORSEY, HISTORICAL
DICTIONARY OF RWANDA, AFRICAN HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES, No. 60, 292 (1994):
The manifesto attacked the whole concept of Belgian administration and maintained that
the basic problem of the country was the conflict between Hutu and Hamite. It blamed
the prevailing atmosphere and the ubuhake system for the lack of African initiative and
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Hutu political movement sought change to a democratic system reflecting the
Hutu majority before independence was granted. " 2 As the 1950s came to a
close and the move toward independence continued, international support for the
Hutu political movement increased." 3 In addition, new Hutu and Tutsi political
parties continued to form. 4
THE BEGINNING OF VIOLENCE
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was the last in a series of massacres that oc-
curred in 1959, 1963, 1964, 1973, 1990, 1992 and 1993."' The first large-scale
violence between the Tutsis and the Hutus occurred in 1959, when a series of
massacres resulted in the death of more than twenty thousand Tutsis.116 Amid
rumors of Belgian involvement, the mysterious death after a medical treatment
of the Rwandan King, followed by the succession of one of his half-brothers,
spawned the violence in July of 1959. 17 The Belgians, having recognized that
free elections would inevitably lead to Hutu rule, did little to stem the violence
or save Tutsi lives or property." 8 After continued arrests and small incidents of
violence, the tension erupted into a massacre when young Tutsi members of an
opposing political party attacked and beat a Hum political party leader. "9
In response, Hutu gangs surfaced, burning Tutsi huts, looting, and killing. 20
The Tutsis retaliated, killing several Hutu political leaders.' 2 ' By the time the
violence had calmed, around three hundred people had died.'22 In response,
the Hutu's lack of economic success. It objected to the assumption that the Tutsi politi-
cal, economic, and social monopoly, which the Belgian administration had fostered, had
led to a cultural monopoly. While the manifesto acknowledged that the Hutu was un-
skilled and poor, it warned that their condition would remain so under the prevailing sys-
tem.
Id.
112. NYROP, supra note 15, at 18.
113. For example, the Catholic Church encouraged Hutus to form political parties. Belgium
shifted support to the Hutu majority, even going so far as to begin to refer to Tutsis as "feudal colo-
nialists." See DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 43; see also READER, supra note 13, at 672.
114. NYROP, supra note 15, at 18-21.
115. Nantulya, supra note 20, at 51.
116. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 14; DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 43. Other estimates
have put the death numbers at between ten and one hundred thousand. See, e.g., KEANE, supra note
10, at 18.
117. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 14; NYROP, supra note 15, at 19.
118. KEANE, supra note 10, at 18; READER, supra note 13, at 672.
119. NYROP, supra note 15, at 20.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. BRIGOS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 14.
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Belgian authorities arrested 1,231 people (919 Tutsis and 312 Hutus). 123 The
country was placed under Belgian military rule, led by Colonel Guy Logiest,
who began replacing Tutsi leaders with Hutus. 24 Asserting his supposed goal to
correct the power imbalance between the Hutu and Tutsi that had been perpetu-
ated through colonization, Logiest played a barely concealed role in attacks
against the Tutsis.' 25 Scores of Tutsis fled the nation while the violence per-
sisted, unchecked by the Belgian military presence. 126
Belgium organized and then delayed a referendum on the monarchy.127 On
January 25, 1960, Belgium granted a right of self-governance to the Provisional
Government of Rwanda to assuage the unrest caused by the delay of the refer-
endum. 128 A few days later, Rwanda's local administrators declared Rwandan
independence, and held elections for the new regime.22 The Belgian admini-
stration granted de facto recognition of the new regime, but soon withdrew it
based on charges of collusion with Hutu political leadership. 3 ° After refusing
to recognize the 1960 elections, the United Nations accepted Rwanda's inde-
pendence and oversaw new elections in September of 1961.1"' The same Hutu
political party, headed by Grrgoire Kayibanda, was again victorious. 13 2
The violence between the Hutu and Tutsi groups continued as the year 1961
progressed.' In that year, approximately one hundred and fifty Tutsis were
killed, five thousand homes were burned, and twenty-two thousand people were
displaced. ' After the confirmation of Rwanda's independence in 1962, Mr.
Kayibanda became the new president. ' As the country became more unsafe
for the Tutsis, they continued to seek refuge in neighboring countries. 3 6 Be-
tween 1961 and 1966, Tutsi militants who had fled to Uganda, Tanzania, Bu-
rundi, and Zaire initiated ten major attacks from these neighboring countries.'37
123. Id.
124. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 14; READER, supra note 13, at 672.
125. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 14.
126. Id. at 14; DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 43-44; READER, supra note 13, at 671-72.
127. BRIGGs & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 14; NYROP, supra note 15, at 23.
128. NYROP, supra note 15, at 23.
129. BRIGGS & BOOTm, supra note 29, at 14; NYROP, supra note 15, at 23; READER, supra note
13, at 672.
130. NYROP, supra note 15, at 23-24 (emphasis added).
131. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 14; NYROP, supra note 15, at 24; READER, supra note
13, at 672.
132. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 14; NYROP, supra note 15, at 24; READER, supra note
13, at 672.
133. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 14; READER, supra note 13, at 673.
134. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 14; READER, supra note 13, at 673 (citation omitted).
135. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 14; DeSouza, supra note 13, at 103; DESTEXHE,
supra note 1, at 44.
136. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 15.
137. DeSouza, supra note 13, at 103. Burundi and Rwanda share the same ethnic mix of Hutu
and Tutsi and were once part of the same colony. Id. Because of the similarities, events in Burundi
14
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In response, Hutu propaganda groups began an anti-Tutsi campaign and dubbed
these Tutsis invenzi, or "cockroaches." '138 Meanwhile, the Kayibanda govern-
ment continually obstructed the return of Tutsi refugees.'39 Consequently, the
number of refugees grew from an estimated one hundred thirty-five thousand to
one hundred fifty thousand persons. 14 0
DISCRIMINATORY POST-COLONIAL GOVERNMENT
The "discriminatory and sectarian policies pursued by immediate post-
independence governments, reinforced the divisions created during the colonial
period" and eventually developed into the policy that orchestrated the geno-
cide.' 41 Among other policies, the Hutu government instituted quotas favoring
the Hutu. '42 The new quota system was based on the fact that because the Tutsis
comprised approximately ten percent of the population-schools, universities and
civil service workplaces were to be limited to no more than ten percent Tutsis.143
The country's poor economic status caused fierce competition for jobs and fur-
ther radicalized ethnic tensions between Hutus and Tutsis. " Meanwhile, Tutsi
refugees continued to make sporadic military forays into Rwanda, stirring up
hostility that led to severe reprisals.'45 One of the most brutal acts of retaliation
occurred in late 1963, when up to ten thousand Tutsis were killed following a
Tutsi attack from Burundi. 1
46
In 1965 and again in 1969, President Kayibanda was re-elected, and his re-
gime became increasingly dictatorial and corrupt. Nevertheless, there was a
period of relative quiet prior to the 1970's that produced an increased number of
mixed Hutu-Tutsi marriages. "' President Kayibanda's administration continued
mirrored and to some extent exacerbated problems in Rwanda as the Tutsi ruling class in Burundi
attempted to regain control. Id. This culminated in a 1972 massacre aimed at eliminating the edu-
cated Hutu and Burundi, leaving two hundred fifty thousand Hum dead. Id. See also READER,
supra note 13, at 673.
138. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 28; READER, supra note 13, at 673.
139. See William A. Shabas, Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post-genocide Rwanda:
Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523, 531-33 (1996).
140. See BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 15; see also DeSouza, supra note 13, at 103.
141. Nantulya, supra note 20.
142. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 44.
143. Id.; READER, supra note 13, at 673-34 (citing PRUNIER, supra note 8, at 60).
144. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 44. Although tensions grew in cities, issues of job competi-
tion were virtually unknown to the peasants living in Rwanda's countryside, where the vast majority
of employment was agricultural. Id.
145. See DeSouza, supra note 13, at 103.
146. Id. at 103; READER, supra note 13, at 674 (citing PRUNIER, supra note 8, at 60).
147. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 44.
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the use of ethnic identity cards in a campaign to target and harass those who
participated in mixed Hutu-Tutsi marriages."' The campaign against mixed
marriages was not specifically anti-Tutsi, but rather a campaign against those
who were modernly educated.149 Nonetheless, the quotas and other anti-Tutsi
governmental policies were considered so rigid that even some Hutus became
apprehensive about the level of governmental control. 5 0
After a military coup removed President Kayibanda from power, Major
General Juvenal Habyarimana took over as the second Hutu president in
1973.' The several years following the coup were quite stable, and between
1973 and 1990 there were no massacres.' 52 However, issues relating to ethnicity
remained culturally significant, as groups formed divisions by protecting the
memories of those who had been massacred.'53 Rwanda was further polarized
due to the president's political manipulation campaigns and favoritism mani-
fested in unequal distribution of resources, which ultimately resulted in height-
ened regional tensions. 54 Despite this polarization, Habyarimana ran for presi-
dent, unopposed, and was reelected in 1978, 1983 and 1988.'5
In 1979, Rwandan Tutsis exiled in Uganda formed a political organization
that later became the Rwandan Patriotic Front ("RPF").156 Although many of
the Ugandan RPF members were born outside of Rwanda, spoke English in
place of French, and did not have personal knowledge of Rwanda, they nonethe-
less felt a tie to their Rwandan heritage, and thus sought the return to their
homeland.' 57 On the other hand, many Rwandan Hutus associated these Ugan-
dan Tutsis with the Tutsi aristocracy that left Rwanda in 1959, a link to histori-
cal inequality that made the RPF movement suspect.158
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. READER, supra note 13, at 674.
151. DeSouza, supra note 13, at 103; DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 44-45; READER, supra note
13, at 674.
152. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 45.
153. Id.
154. Id.; READER, supra note 13, at 674. Habyarimana came from northern Rwanda, and was
known for showing favoritism to the Hutus of northern Rwanda, as well as for persecution of the
Tutsi minority. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 45. Northern Hums, as a group, were the most hateful
and divisive due to their past experiences "at the hands of the Germans and their Tutsi allies, who
subdued the north in the early part of the century." KEANE, supra note 10, at 21.
155. See generally, supra note 97, at 100-18.
156. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 45. Although the RPF has been characterized as a Tutsi party,
the RPF has always taken "care to include Hutus within its ranks and avoided presenting an image of
an exclusively Tutsi party." Id., citing, generally, Gdrard Prunier, Element pour une histoire du
Front patriotique Rwandais, POLITIQUE AFRICAINE, No. 51 (October 1993). According to
Destexhe, "The article challenges a number of stereotypes connected with the RI'F, particularly
regarding its ethnic composition." DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 87. See also READER, supra note 13,
at 674.
157. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 44-45.
158. Id. at 45.
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The Ugandan political regime was hostile to Rwandan refugees and encour-
aged Uganda's political youth groups to attack the refugees and their prop-
erty.'59 As a result of the success of the youth groups' attacks in 1982 and 1983,
the Rwandan refugees in Uganda attempted to return to Rwanda.'60 The Rwan-
dan government responded by closing its borders. 6' Meanwhile, due to falling
coffee prices and food shortages, a wave of economic and social pressures dis-
rupted the Rwandan government's level of control to the extent that criticism of
the government policies and charges of corruption and mismanagement became
public.' 62  The international aid community acquired President Habyarimana's
agreement to establish a multi-party democracy and to leave the country's de-
velopment open to debate. 63  Although President Habyarimana agreed to the
changes in principle, the changes were never implemented. "
RADICALIZED POLITICS
According to Alain Destexhe, the years prior to 1994 were a time of intense
political growth. Destexhe writes:
It is not as well-known as it should be that for the previous two or three years [prior to the
genocide] an impressive movement in favour of a multi-party system, the rule of law and a
respect for human rights had grown up in Rwanda. There were a large number of [individual]
initiatives, the monopoly of one-party power had been broached and independent human
rights organisations set up. In the eyes of the [two powerful racist political parties, the] CDR
and MRND these democrats were traitors who only merited the fate of all traitors. Although
there were certainly many obstacles, political change seemed inevitable and reconciliation
hovered on the horizon, but only at the expense of the racist parties who had the most to lose
from them-and everything to gain by preventing them. 
165
The Hutu power structure first developed an extremist agenda around 1990,
when the RPF presented its first serious military challenge. 66 On October 1,
1990, the RPF, headed by Major General Fred Rwigyema, invaded Rwanda. 167
The RPF insisted that its goal was to not to reinstate a Tutsi government, but
159. PRUNIER, supra note 8, at 69.
160. Id. at 69-70.
161. Id.
162. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 45; PRUNIER, supra note 8, at 89.
163. PRUNIER, supra note 8, at 89-90.
164. Id. at 90.
165. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 29. The two Hutu power parties were the Coalition for the
Defense of the Republic ("CDR") and a branch of the Movement Rdpublican National for Develop-
ment ("MRND"). Id. at 28-29.
166. Id. at 28.
167. DORSEY, supra note 111, at 116-18. See also DeSouza, supra note 13, at 104; DESTEXHE,
supra note 1, at 46; READER, supra note 13, at 675.
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rather to bring democracy to Rwanda. 6' Meanwhile, the extremist Hutu gov-
ernment's anti-Tutsi propaganda presented Tutsis as a wealthy foreign minority,
and the root of Rwanda's economic and social problems.'69 The invasion in-
cited ethnic tension since the RPF's goal was perceived as an attempt to over-
throw the Hutu government and install a Tutsi government, returning the Hutus
to a position of servitude.'70 The invasion was unsuccessful and Rwigyema was
killed in the fight, but as a result, President Habyarimana increased the Rwandan
army from about five thousand troops in 1990 to about thirty-five thousand by
1993. 171
Out of revenge for the RPF's invasion in October of 1990, President Ha-
byarimana began a series of pogroms against thousands of Tutsis and opposition
Hutus. 72 Starting that same month, the Habyarimana government instigated and
participated in increased numbers of unpunished Tutsis massacres. 7 3  Later
estimates show the government killed up to two thousand Rwandan Tutsis and
anti-government Hutus between October, 1990 and January, 1993. ' The gov-
ernment instituted radical anti-Tutsi propaganda in order to stunt the growing
political opposition led by Tutsis and moderate Hutus, an opposition that was
feared to potentially result in governmental power-sharing.175 The Hutu power
structure's extremism grew in response to its leader's desire to retain power.'76
At this time, Tutsis were at a serious political disadvantage: there were only two
Tutsi members of parliament, one Tutsi town mayor, no Tutsi regional mayors,
and one Tutsi ambassador.' 77
The government continued to develop an ethnically motivated agenda. 7 In
September of 1992, Rwandan Armed Forces headquarters issued a document
targeting the principal enemy and the enemy's supporters. 7 9 The document
defined the principal enemy as "Tutsis inside the country or outside, extremists
and longing to return to power, who have never recogni[z]ed and never will
recogni[z]e the reality of the 1959 social revolution [when the Tutsi were thrown
168. DeSouza, supra note 13, at 104; READER, supra note 13, at 674.
169. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 28. This characterization is similar to Nazis' stigmatization of
the Jews. Id. The Rwandan national army was supported by troops from Zaire, Belgium and
France. READER, supra note 8, at 675.
170. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 46.
171. READER, supra note 13, at 674. The troops were armed with weapons from France, South
Africa and the United States. Id.
172. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 46; READER, supra note 13, at 674.
173. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 28; READER, supra note 13, at 674.
174. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 17; READER, supra note 13, at 675. See also
DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 46.
175. KEANE, supra note 10, at 24.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 23.
178. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 29.
179. Id. at 29.
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out of power], and who would take back power in Rwanda by any means possi-
ble, including the use of arms."'8 ° The enemy's supporters were "anybody who
gives any kind of support to the main enemy.'' l
Unrest and outbreaks of violence continued throughout the country.'12 The
violence caused Tutsi population movements, making Hum peasants vulnerable
to extremist Hums' claims that the Tutsis were coming to take the Hutu peas-
ants' land.'83 Due to national and international pressure, President Habyarimana
again agreed to introduce multi-party democracy, and to cease the use of the
ethnic identity cards instituted by the Belgian government, although these
changes were not implemented. 1'
Radicalized power politics took a new turn as the Interhamwe (a Rwandan
word meaning "those who attack together") and the Impuzamugambi ( "those
who have only one aim"), the youth branches of the MRND and CDR, respec-
tively, quickly developed fifty thousand members.'85 These groups worked with
the Rwandan army to develop a strategy for the government to retain control of
the media, and to train and form civilians into militias.' 86 Both the media and
the militias were used extensively to perpetrate the 1994 genocide. '87 The In-
terhamwe and Impuzamugambi engaged in raiding and intimidation against
Tutsis and moderate Hums who supported a democratic government. '88 Mean-
while, the RPF, now headed by Major Paul Kagame, continued guerrilla warfare
against Habyarimana's regime, striking at targets throughout Rwanda and in-
creasing the number of RPF troops to nearly twenty-five thousand. '89
Once again, Habyarimana bowed to international pressures and in August,
1993 agreed to a number of government reforms pursuant to the Arusha Ac-
cords.' 9 These reforms included establishment of the rule of law, political ac-
countability and multi-party power, repatriation and resettlement of refugees,
and integration of the RPF into Rwanda's armed forces.' 9, Although the Arusha
180. Id. at 30.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 46.
183. See KEANE, supra note 10, at 22-23.
184. See generally BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 17.
185. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 29.
186. Id.; Genocide in Rwanda, 6 HuM. RTS. WATCH/AFR. 2 (1994), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/world/rwanda-pubs.php.
187. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 29.
188. Id.
189. BRIGGs & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 17; READER, supra note 13, at 675.
190. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 46; KEANE, supra note 10, at 26-27; READER, supra note 13,
at 675.
191. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 17; DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 46; KEANE, supra
note 10, at 26-27; READER, supra note 13, at 675; Shabas, supra note 139, at 524.
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Accords were signed, the vocal opposition by both Hum and Tutsi hardliners
prevented the agreement from being implemented.' 92 Unfortunately, although
Habyarimana agreed to the political and social reforms, the Hum political power
structure responded by becoming increasingly radicalized because the Arusha
accords "offered credible possibilities for national reconciliation and peace for
the majority of Rwandans at the expense of the ruling Hum parties."' 93 At this
point, Hum extremists formulated their plan to target Tutsis and moderate
Hutus.' 94 Ethnic tensions and hostilities deepened, to the extent that the United
Nations Human Rights Commission reported a warning of future violence. 95
Despite the Human Rights Commission's warning and with the French govern-
ment's assistance, the Rwandan Armed Forces grew from five thousand to forty
thousand troops, and began to provide arms and military training to members of
the militia such as the Interhamwe.96
Besides the Rwandan military and militias, the Habyarimana government
used several other outlets that sought to indoctrinate Rwandans with extremism
and hatred. The government also made extensive use of the transistor radio as a
method for political indoctrination and to create tensions between the Hutus and
the Tutsis.197 In the year prior to the beginning of the genocide, two of Ha-
byarimana's associates set up Radio Mille Collines, a private radio station
broadcasting hate propaganda and calling for violence against the Tutsis." 8 In
addition, the newspaper Kangura published similar calls to violence and urged
Rwandans to use any means necessary to cause negotiations with the RPF to
fail.' 99 The radio and newspaper outlets were developed and cultivated as a
comprehensive approach to reach the vast majority of Rwandan citizens. 2"
These media outlets were successful because the government instituted a process
of personally contacting citizens through a web of leaders trained at persuading
and pressuring citizens into compliance and agreement. 2° The program of in-
doctrination was even more successful because the government had already
fostered a "culture of impunity and violence, which had been created by succes-
sive governments that had actively and publicly promoted the killings of Tutsi
individuals, as well as anyone else who resisted this call."2 2
192. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 47; Shabas, supra note 139, at 524.
193. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 28; see also KEANE, supra note 10, at 27; READER, supra note
13, at 676.
194. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 28; READER, supra note 13, at 676.
195. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 29.
196. Id.
197. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 30; READER, supra note 13, at 676.
198. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 30; KEANE, supra note 10, at 10.
199. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 30.
200. Id. at 31.
201. Id.
202. Nantulya, supra note 20, at 51.
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THE GENOCIDE
"The grave is only half full. Who will help us fill it?"
-Radio Mille Collines, Rwanda, April 199423
By March of 1994, citizens were beginning to evacuate Kigali in anticipa-
tion of future violence.2° On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana was assas-
sinated when his plane was shot down near the Kigali airport. 2 5 The newspa-
pers and radio had already created an environment of anti-Tutsi hysteria, and
Habyarimana's murder, which was blamed on the RPF, provided the catalyst to
begin the genocide. °6 The assassination spawned a Rwandan military and in-
terhamwe killing process that was well planned and quickly executed.207
The killing campaign began before dawn the following day, with the Presi-
dential Guard and militia members killing political opposition leaders and mod-
erate Hutus. 2°" Also among the first targeted were politicians, journalists and
civil rights activists.20 9 Kigali became increasingly violent, as more Tutsis were
hunted and massacred. 21" The killing was often violent and hand-to-hand:
The militia carried out their gruesome task with a variety of weapons - AK-47 assault rifles,
grenades, and pangas (the all-purpose, heavy bladed machetes). Some killed their victims
with a club, studded with nails... The scale and brutality are horrifying: rape, torture, muti-
lation, unspeakably cruel murder; mothers forced to watch their children die before being
killed themselves; children forced to kill their families. Mutilations were common, and ma-
cabre ritual was evident: brutality... [did] not end with murder. At massacre sites, corpses,
many of them those of children, have been methodically dismembered and the body parts
stacked neatly in separate piles. 211
203. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 30.
204. KEANE, supra note 10, at 196.
205. PRUNIER, supra note 8, at 211-21; DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 31; READER, supra note 13,
at 676.
206. KEANE, supra note 10, at 28-29.
207. READER, supra note 13, at 676. For specifics on the genocide killing processes, see
KEANE, supra note 10, at 74-81, 88-91.
208. PRUNIER, supra note 8, at 229-30; DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 31; READER, supra note 13,
at 676.
209. READER, supra note 13, at 677.
210. PRUNIER, supra note 8, at 231. French and Belgian troops evacuated almost every white
person from Rwanda within several days, but the soldiers conducting the evacuation were ordered to
ignore the plight of the Rwandans being massacred. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 48.
211. READER, supra note 13, at 677 (internal citations omitted).
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The United Nations, embassies and non-governmental organizations generally
did not evacuate their Rwandan personnel, leaving them at the mercy of the
killers.212
On April 8, the RPF launched a military campaign to end the genocide and
regain control of the Rwandan government.213 Meanwhile, the government-
sponsored killing continued."' A new Hutu government was formed to replace
Habyarimana, and Radio Mille Collines continued to incite violence with state-
ments such as one broadcast at the end of April 1994, that "[b]y 5 May, the
country must be completely cleansed of Tutsis."2 5 The media also targeted
children, with statements such as, "We will not repeat the mistake of 1959. The
children must be killed too."2 6 Rwanda's official state radio constantly called
on Hums to defend Rwanda against invasion by the invenzi (meaning "cock-
roaches").2 7 The media convinced Hum peasants that they were under threat,
and asked them to .'make the Tutsis smaller' by decapitating them."2 8 The
media was so effective that peasants in the northern areas were "astonished that
the Tutsi soldiers did not have horns, tails and eyes that shone in the dark," as
described on the radio.219
There have been estimates that, by the end of April 1994, one hundred thou-
sand people were killed. 2 1 Meanwhile, the world watched and declined to
act. 221 As Fergal Keane documented, "[t]here were some fearful pictures com-
ing out of Kigali: mounds of bodies and roadblocks manned by machete-
wielding gangs., 222 The United Nations called for a ceasefire, but also reduced
the number of its troops in Rwanda from two thousand five hundred to two hun-
dred seventy. 223  The United Nations Security Council debated the situation
occurring in Rwanda but refrained from, in all paperwork, deeming the killing a
genocide in order to avoid the international law requirement to intervene in the
conflict.2 24 The United States declined to act for a number of reasons, but
212. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 48. For an analysis of the United Nations's role in Rwanda,
see, e.g., MICHAEL BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA
(Comell University Press, 2002).
213. KEANE, supra note 10, at 196.
214. Id. at 196-197.
215. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 32.
216. Id.
217. KEANE, supra note 10, at 10.
218. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 32.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 32.
221. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 48.
222. KEANE, supra note 10, at 10.
223. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 48.
224. Id. at 50. At this time, Rwanda had a seat on the United Nations Security Council and
Rwanda's ambassador was a member of Habyarimana's regime. Id. At this point, the United Na-
tions' military role was limited to peacekeeping, not actively entering into military conflict. Id
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largely in reaction to the killing of American soldiers in Somalia. 225  Belgium
had already evacuated its nationals and withdrawn its troops subsequent to the
RPF offensive in October, 1990.226 Only France, after having provided the main
support for the Habyarimana regime after the RPF attack in 1990, and having
played the pivotal role in stopping RPF advances in 1992 and February of 1993,
finally stepped in and sent seven hundred peacekeeping troops to establish a
"security zone" for civilians. 27
In May, the United Nations agreed to send six thousand eight hundred
troops and police to Rwanda to defend civilians, but the implementation was
delayed due to discussions about logistical support and costs. 2 s By mid-May,
the death toll had reached an estimated two hundred thousand, and an estimated
five hundred thousand by the end of May. 229 Those Tutsis who survived the
genocide escaped the country, if possible, or fled to areas under RPF control. 231
Still, the killing continued.131 On July 4, the RPF captured Kigali and the Hutu
government fled to Zaire. 32 As the RPF continued to advance, the genocide
planners organized an intimidation campaign forcing the remaining Hutu to flee
the country and causing a humanitarian crisis that captured international media
attention.233 In all, within one hundred days, up to a million Tutsis and politi-
cally moderate Hutus had been murdered.3
225. Id. at 49-50. In fact, the United Nations force in Kigali had been cut, due to pressure from
the United States and Belgium, from two hundred fifty thousand troops to two hundred fifty troops.
KEANE, supra note 10, at 123.
226. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 52.
227. Id at 53-55. The "security zone" was used by both victims and genocidaires, and Radio
Mille Collines continued to broadcast from that area until mid-July. Id at 54. See KEANE, supra
note 10, at 25-26, for information regarding France's role in defending Habyarimana's regime. In
bridf, France supported Habyarimana's regime, at least in part, to preserve a Francophone Africa,
which would not have been possible under RPF rule because the RPF, having been located in Eng-
lish-speaking Uganda, was led by those who were largely English-speaking. KEANE, supra note 10,
at 25-26.
228. KEANE, supra note 10, at 196.
229. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 49.
230. Id. at 55.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 83.
233. Id. The humanitarian crisis involved not only issues relating to disease, food distribution
and return home of the refugees, but also issues relating to power struggles between militias repre-
senting political groups that were attempting to exert influence in the refugee camps. Id. at 56-57;
KEANE, supra note 10, at 100-01. For example, the easiest way for aid organizations to organize the
refugee camps was to use the power structures that existed in Rwanda, structures that were headed
by local leaders who were genocidaires and resisted removal from their positions of leadership or
indeed consolidated their power. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 57; KEANE, supra note 10, at 95-96,
101-07. These issues resulted in the risk of humanitarian aid contributing to the consolidation of the
previous power structure in a similar power play to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, who seized
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By July 17, 1994, the RPF had established the Government of National
Unity, bringing the civil war to an end.235 On July 18, 1994, the RPF announced
itself victorious and declared a cease-fire.236 The United Nations Security Coun-
cil sent forces that replaced the French troops by the end of August.23 7 For the
next three years, violence continued sporadically as tensions persisted at and
around refugee settlements.238  Hutus continued guerrilla attacks planned from
outside Rwandan borders.23 9 The RPF retained control, and the United Nations
withdrew its troops in March 1996.240 As Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi refugees
returned home, the country continued to recover from the effects of genocide.241
THE AFTERMATH OF TRAGEDY
Arrests for genocide-related crimes averaged between one thousand and
three thousand per month from July 1994 through September 1998.242 The
prison population within Rwanda increased from ten thousand in 1994 to nearly
one hundred thirty thousand by 1998.243 The RPF government made little at-
tempt to investigate genocide charges, often arresting those accused of genocide
purely on the basis of an accusation. 2' The government entered villages in
which most Tutsis had been killed and arrested all those who appeared to have
committed genocide.2 45  Defendants' cases received no further attention after
arrests were made, as what remained of Rwanda's judicial system was a sham-
power through the manipulation of humanitarian aid. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 57-58. For infor-
mation regarding the aid issues paralleling those in Cambodia, see generally ALAIN DESTEXHE,
L'HUMAN1TAIRE IMPOSSIBLE OU DEUX SItCLES D'AMBIGUITIS (Armand Colin, 1993); WILLIAM
SHAWCROSS, THE QUALITY OF MERCY: CAMBODIA, HOLOCAUST AND MODERN CONSCIENCE
(Simon and Schuster, 1984).
234. The vast majority of those killed were Tutsis, with moderate Hutus numbering in the tens
of thousands. See ALISON DES FORGES, LEAvE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
14(1999).
235. See Shabas, supra note 139, at 523.
236. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 83.
237. Id.; BARNETT, supra note 212, at 151.
238. BARNETT, supra note 212, at 150-151; see BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 19.
239. BARNETr, supra note 212, at 150; BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 19.
240. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 19.
241. Id. at 20-21 (citation omitted).
242. International Crisis Group, Five Years after the Genocide in Rwanda: Justice in Question,
ICG Report Rwanda No. I, at 10 (1999), available at
http://www.icg.org//library/documents/reportarchive/A400224_07041999.pdf.
243. Mark Drumbl, Rule of Law amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda's
Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 545, 571 (1998).
244. See Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7
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bles.246 Many former judges and prosecutors were either killed in the genocide
or fled the country, some having been implicated in the killings themselves. 247
Further complicating matters, in mid-July 1994, approximately eight hun-
dred fifty thousand Rwandans, most of Hutu origin, fled with the defeated
Rwandan Army of the former Hutu government and the militias into what is
now the Zaire. 248 The Rwandans fled to refugee camps, which sparked an enor-
mous humanitarian crisis.2 49 This provided a shield for the Hutu Rwandan army
and militias which enabled them to regroup in the camps and to call for renewed
war by spreading propaganda that the RPF was responsible for genocide against
the Hutus and denying the slaughter of the Tutsi.25 ° Human rights organizations
have since charged the RPF with the use of excessive force and brutality in at-
tempting to disband Hutu extremists groups that were organized in refugee
camps. 5' Meanwhile, as the RPF attempted to maintain peace across the border
in Rwanda, RPF troops engaged in several massacres of unarmed and unresist-
ing civilians; these abuses were largely ignored by the government. 252
246. See id. at 353.
247. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 20-21; Rwanda: A New Catastrophe? Increased
International Efforts Required to Punish Genocide and Prevent further Bloodshed, 6 HUM. RTS.
WATCHiAFR. 11 (1994) (hereinafter "Rwanda: A New Catastrophe?"). Retrospectively, it is inter-
esting to note that Francis Deng, the United Nations Secretary-General's Representative on Inter-
nally Displaced Persons, reported that "in the absence of a functioning judicial and law enforcement
system," alternative dispute resolution methods were recommended for the resolution of property
and land disputes related to the illegal occupation of property following the end of the genocide. See
Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis Deng, Addendum, Internally
Displaced Persons: Note on the mission to Rwanda, E/CN.4/1995/50/Add.4, paragraph no. 21,
submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/95, United Nations Economic
and Social Council, Fifty-first session, Agenda item 11 (d) (February 1995), available at http://ods-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G95/l10/91/PDF/G9511091.pdf?OpenElement. Mr. Deng spe-
cifically proposed customary legal traditions such as gacaca, and noted that involving elders and
other community authorities appeared a promising option. Id.
248. See Shabas, supra note 139, at 524.
249. Rwanda: A New Catastrophe?, supra note 247, at 3.
250. Id.
251. See KEANE, supra note 10, at 177. Author's note: This criticism is in no way meant to
compare the RPF actions with those of the genocidaires. See DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 3-4.
Raphael Lemkin was a Polish-born World War II-era advisor to the United States War Ministry who
coined the term "genocide" and whose efforts brought about the Convention for the Prevention and
the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which was approved by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in Resolution 260 A (III) of December 9, 1948 and entered into effect on January 12,
1951. Id. He offered the theory that genocide is not a war crime, and the immorality of a crime such
as genocide should not be confused with the amorality of war. Id. (citing ANDRE FOSSARD, LE
CRIME CONTRE L'HUMANITt (Robert Laffont, 1987)).
252. Rwanda: A New Catastrophe?, supra note 247, at 8-10.
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TEN YEARS OF HEALING
From its inception in 1994, the Government of National Unity has refused
to grant any amnesties and has been committed to prosecuting all those accused
of genocide.253 The decision to prosecute all the accused was not without peril
as it required the commitment of virtually limitless time and resources on the
part of the new Rwandan government.25 4 At this time, the government was in its
earliest stages and had few resources at hand for any sort of undertaking. 2"
However, the government felt that addressing the issue of collective blame, in
hopes of finally uniting Rwandan Hums and Tutsis as "Rwandans," was neces-
sary to the formation of a functioning society.256 As Destexhe states, the goal
was to avoid:
a situation where no individuals are to be singled out as guilty or responsible because blame
is laid at the door of historical fate and 'unfortunate circumstances,' 'the climate of the time'
and sheer bad luck. It would be hard to deny that some form of evil has always existed in the
world. But if such evil is seen in general, impersonal terms such as barbarism, 'man's inhu-
manity to man,' chance circumstance or plain hatred, then there are no individual culprits at
whom an accusing finger can be pointed. On the other hand, if everyone is considered to be
somehow involved and therefore somehow responsible, then the picture becomes hazy and
guilt and innocence are somehow confused. This so-called collective blame is just another
way of denying the facts. 
2 57
Destexhe's point about collective blame notwithstanding, the 1994 genocide
is, often rightly, explained in light of factors such as the civil war, President
Habyarimana's assassination, the mob mentality created by fear and ancient
hatred, the citizens' justifiable anger at social conditions, and the historical
domination of the country by the Tutsis. 255 The gacaca process is an attempt to
address the duality of issues such as collective blame, on the one hand, and true
social conditions that should be considered mitigating factors when any one
person's crimes are judge, on the other hand.25" The validity of these explana-
tions, when applied to some cases, is clearly a factor in the choice of gacaca as a
process to resolve the crimes 6. 2 " Gacaca provides a fluid process that allows the
courts and communities to hold defendants accountable for their individual ac-
tions based on the application of "collective blame" factors as well as individual
circumstances.2 6 '
253. Id. at 9.
254. BRiGGs & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 20-2 1.
255. Id.
256. Nsenga Speech, supra note 5.
257. DESTEXHE, supra note 1, at 7.
258. Id. at 13.
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THE INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROCESS
In November of 1994, the United Nations Security Council established the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR").262 The ICTR's mandate
is to "pronounce judgments and impose sentences and penalties on persons con-
victed of serious violations of international humanitarian law" and genocide-
related crimes between January 1 and December 31, 1994.263 The ICTR's work
has had groundbreaking effects in the international community, as it was the
first international court to render a judgment on the crime of genocide, and was
the first international court to indict and subsequently convict former heads of
state for the crime of genocide. 26
However, the ICTR's impact on Rwandan citizens has been limited. The
ICTR is perceived by many Rwandans to be a slow international process that
does not affect Rwanda.265 But, despite criticism from local political forces,
prosecutions and convictions by international war crimes tribunals have fostered
a more moderate political climate in Rwanda. 266 Accountability has an effect on
high-level political leaders who might otherwise have fomented ethnic divisions
as a method of retaining power. 267 However, as of September 2004, in the more
than nine years since the tribunal commenced, only twenty-three cases have
been resolved through trial or negotiation. 268 The country of Rwanda is faced
with the task of resolving the approximately one hundred thirty thousand other
262. Rwanda: A New Catastrophe?, supra note 247, at 3.
263. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 22, § 1 (emphasis added),
available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html.
264. Achievements of ICTR: Message from Kofi Annan, at http://www.ictr.org/about.htm.
Author's Note: The international standard for criminal trials requires a Western concept of due
process that is embodied in the United Nations Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 263. Guaranteed
rights include the right to fair trial, prepare a defense, present witnesses, cross examine opposing
witnesses, free interpreter, legal assistance paid for by the ICTR if the accused cannot afford coun-
sel, and retaining the right against self-incrimination. Id.
265. Speech of Mr. Brian A. Kritz, former Resident Legal Advisor to the Prosecutor General's
Office of the Republic of Rwanda, given at Georgetown University on November 11, 2004. A
common perception among members of the Rwandan public is that ICTR employees from third
world countries are much more interested in the continuation of the organization's existence than
they are interested in speeding the course of justice, as these employees are making far more money
working for an international organization than they would working for an employer in their home
countries. Id.
266. Ruth Wedgwood and Harold K. Jacobson, Foreword, Symposium: State Reconstruction
After Civil Conflict, 95 AM. J. OF INT'L LAW (2001).
267. Id.
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cases in which the defendants are currently held in the Rwandan prison sys-
tem. 269
DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTING A RWANDAN JUSTICE PROCESS
The gacaca system is meant to address individual cases, as well as over-
arching issues of reconciliation so that Rwanda can develop into a stable country
with a harmonious culture.27 Reconciliation is an important goal because after
decolonization, and especially the four years prior to the 1994 genocide, crimes
based on ethnic hatred against Tutsis were decriminalized to the point that peo-
ple could commit ethnically motivated crimes with little or no fear of prosecu-
tion.27' Given the history of impunity and prosecutorial misconduct, the new
government of Rwanda remains faced with the task of both carrying out the
administration of justice, and also building the population's trust in a historically
at best impotent, and at worst biased and corrupt national government and
prosecution system.
272
Some of the practical problems facing Rwanda when gacaca was first con-
sidered as a potential solution to the genocide have been described as follows:
- A weak judicial sector, resulting from widespread destruction, both before and during the
genocide;
- The administrative strain created by the presence of more than 135,000 inmates who have
not yet been tried, and the presence of several other suspects who have not yet been brought
to justice;
- The weaknesses of the classical justice system in addressing the psychological aspects of the
genocide, which has a lot to do with negative mass mobile[z]ation and ideological manipula-
tion, both of which have been systematically cultivated for several years;
- The legal complexities surrounding classical justice, which makes it difficult for ordinary
people to participate, and for community healing to occur;
- The non-reconciliatory nature of the classical justice system, which does not holistically or
organically address the rehabilitation of convicts or the fundamental causes of the genocide.
Consequently, the securing of convictions does not automatically translate into the eradica-
tion of a culture of impunity-something which was at the source of the 1994 genocide, as
well as others in Rwanda.
273
269. Interview with Geraldine Umugwaneza, Judge/Trainer, Gacaca Jurisdictions (hereinafter
"Umugwaneza Interview"). As of spring 2004, the categorization process, through which defen-
dants are formally charged, is nearly complete. Id.
270. Nantulya, supra note 20, at 51-53.
271. Shabas, supra note 139, at 531. For example, there was a massacre of Tutsis in March
1992. Id. Although upwards of four hundred individuals were arrested, they were subsequently
released and the prosecutor's office did not pursue the matter further. Id. at 531-32.
272. Rwanda: A New Catastrophe?, supra note 247, at 9.
273. Nantulya, supra note 20, at 53.
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Rwanda had ratified the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide.274 However, another theoretical legal difficulty
arose because of the fact that crimes based on ethnic hatred, genocide or crimes
against humanity were excused under Rwandan law and unpunished in the years
leading up to the 1994 genocide provided notice to Rwandans that genocidal
acts were not criminal. 275  Consequently, the post-genocide Rwandese Transi-
tional National Assembly, charged with consideration of which judicial system
to adopt to address the genocide, struggled with the question of how to adopt
new measures to adequately satisfy the requirements for justice, without raising
ex post facto issues. 116
On a practical note, the Rwandan government was also faced with issues re-
lated to health care, education, development and nation building, for a largely
peasant citizenry that had been dealt a great deal of psychological damage due to
trauma inflicted by members of its own population. 277  These factors were
among those framing the discussion about post-genocide justice.27 s In order to
understand why the Rwandan government chose gacaca as the solution to these
and many other factors, one must take into account the unique history of
Rwanda's legal system, and the role that the gacaca customary dispute resolu-
tion process has played in the country's social fabric.279
THE HISTORY OF GACACA
Traditional gacaca was a community-based dispute resolution forum in pre-
colonial Rwanda. 28° Gacaca customary dispute resolution forums were fostered
by a sense of unity felt among Rwandans during the pre-colonial time period.28'
Gacaca was the customary legal and social code used via the power structure of
274. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 260 (III) A, Decmeber 9, 1948, entered into force January 12, 1951, in
accordance with Article XIII, acceded to (in relevant part) by Rwanda on April 16, 1975.
275. Law on General Amnesty on political offences committed between 1st October 1959 and
I st July 1962, official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda 1963, P. 229, cited In "Codes et Lois du
Rwanda," Vol.1, 2nd Ed., 431; Decree Law of 30th November 1974, granting Amnesty to certain
Political crimes, official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 1974, 629.
276. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda: A Human
Rights First report on the ICTR and National Trials, VIII.c (1997), available at
http://www.Ichr.org/pubs/descriptions/rwanda.htm (hereinafter "Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights") (citation omitted).
277. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 20-21.
278. Id.
279. Nsenga Speech, supra note 5.
280. BRIGGS & BOOTH, supra note 29, at 22.
281. Nantulya, supra note 20, at 53.
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chieftaincies, and was composed of courts that settled conflicts among family or
community members. 82  Because communities participated in the gacaca
courts, punishment of those who were found guilty was meted out by the collec-
tive society.283 In addition, communities also performed collective welcoming
rites for persons who had completed their punishments, in order to recreate the
sense of belonging within the community.284
Gacaca has been translated to mean "justice under the tree," in reference to
community elders' practice of hearing cases while sitting under a tree.285 Tradi-
tionally, gacaca matters were judged by a respected community leader or lead-
ers who involved the entire community in the dispute resolution process. 6 In
Rwanda, unlike in some African countries, girls and women participated in the
gacaca system, even after marriage.287 While the parties gave their sides of the
story and stated an expectation for the outcome, the final decision fell to the
elder or elders judging the matter.288 After the gacaca resolution, the two parties
were expected to maintain a social relationship.289
Gacaca disputes generally involved less serious civil matters, including
cases related to inheritance, civil liability, failure to repay loans, and marital
issues. 290 Gacaca was also used in some criminal matters such as minor matters
of violence, theft, destruction of property, or domestic concerns.291 Punishments
resembled civil damages rather than imprisonment.292 Sanctions were imposed
to: (1) cause the accused individual to appreciate the gravity of the damage
caused, and (2) allow the accused individual a mechanism for reintegration into
the community. 293 These two objectives are foundational to the use of gacaca in
the effort toward reconciliation in the wake of genocide.294
282. Id.
283. Id. at 53-54.
284. Id.
285. J. Sarkin, The Tension Between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Politics, Human
Rights, Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with the Genocide, 45 J. AFR.
LAW 143, 159 (2001).
286. See generally Bolaji Owasanoye, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Constitutional
Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, 14 UNITAR DOCUMENT SERIES: ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
METHODS, available at
http://www.unitar.org/dfm/Resource Center/DocumentSeries/Document 14/DocSeries 14.pdf.
287. Nantulya, supra note 20, at 53; Owasanoye, supra note 286, at 18 (describing the fact that
women have been historically excluded from African customary dispute resolution processes).
288. Owasanoye, supra note 286, at 18.
289. Id.
290. Sarkin, supra note 285, at 159.
291. Nantulya, supra note 20, at 53; see also Owasanoye, supra note 286, at 18.
292. Stef Vandeginste, Justice, Reconciliation and Reparation after Genocide and Crimes
Against Humanity: The Proposed Establishment of Popular Gacaca Tribunals in Rwanda (1999).
293. See id. at 15.
294. Interview with Johnson Busingye, Attorney General, Office of the Prosecutor General,
Republic of Rwanda (hereinafter "Busingye Interview").
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The colonial period facilitated the transition from a decentralized gacaca
system toward a more formalized legal system that applied the law of the colo-
nial powers. 95 However, gacaca generally continued to provide the basic
method of dispute resolution for local Rwandan legal matters. 96 Courts estab
lished during colonial times often accepted customary law handed down by
gacaca judges as binding, and there are cases in which courts actually reviewed
appeals of gacaca decisions, rather than re-litigating entire matters.297
Historically, the gacaca and the formal Rwandan court system have com-
plemented each other.298 The historic complement between Rwanda's custom-
ary and Western systems is one of the most important reasons that the gacaca
process will be an effective model for resolving genocide cases. 99
DECISIONS ON JUSTICE
In searching for a methodology to resolve the vast number of genocide
cases pending disposition in Rwanda, the Government of National Unity hosted
an international conference entitled "Genocide, Impunity and Accountability," at
which international legal and policy experts and Rwandan leaders convened to
discuss the prosecution of the 1994 genocide.3" The conference made a number
of new recommendations for methods of handling the genocide cases, including
the creation of "specialized chambers of the existing courts, a classification
scheme to separate the main organizers of the genocide from criminals with
lesser degrees of responsibility, and a unique scheme aimed at encouraging of-
fenders to confess in exchange for substantially reduced sentences.""'' Further,
the conference drafted legislation entitled "Organic Law on the Organization of
Prosecution for Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against
Humanity Committed Since 1 October 1990" (hereinafter "Organic Law
8/96").302
295. Nsenga Speech, supra note 5.
296. Id.
297. Nantulya, supra note 20, at 53.
298. Nsenga Speech, supra note 5.
299. Id.
300. Shabas, supra note 139, at 528.
301. Id. at 530.
302. Id. The Organic Law, as drafted, provided the foundation for the gacaca system as it is
now conceived, including "a classification scheme to separate the main organizers of the genocide
from criminals with lesser degrees of responsibility, and a unique scheme aimed at encouraging
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On August 30, 1996, the Rwandan National Assembly adopted Organic
Law 8/96 which prescribed the methodology for carrying out the genocide tri-
als.3"3 Organic Law 8/96 established four categories of genocide suspects.
30 4
Classification of these offenders was necessary because, as Mr. Busingye says,
genocide crimes were often the result of strong state supervision and control, an
important mitigating factor in consideration of the crimes perpetrated by many
Rwandan genocidaires.3 5 The classifications are:
Category 1.
a. persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among the
planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or of a
crime against humanity;
b. persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, perfectoral, communal, sector
or cell level, or in a political party, or fostered such crimes;
c. notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they com-
mitted atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or where they passed;
d. persons who committed acts of sexual torture;
Category 2.
persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among perpe-
trators, conspirators or accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious assault against the
person causing death;
Category 3.
persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make them guilty of other
serious assaults against the person;
Category 4.
persons who committed offences against property. 306
Further, Organic Law 8/96 created Western-style special chambers within
the twelve Tribunals of First Instance to try people accused of more serious
crimes and genocidal acts.30 7
Finally, Organic Law 8/96 instituted a confession and guilty pleading pro-
cedure in order to counterbalance the numerous atrocities in which the only
available information is the eyewitness testimony of fellow genocidaires."'
The pleading procedure allows those who confess in accordance with legal pro-
visions and provide evidence or testimony against other suspects to receive a
303. Organic Law No. 8/96, supra note 5.
304. Id.; Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
305. Id.
306. Organic Law No. 8/96, supra note 5, at Art. 2.
307. Id. at Art. 19.
308. Id.; Nsenga Speech, supra note 5.
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considerable reduction in penalty.3"9 The pleading procedure also serves a rec-
onciliation goal, to establish the truth of the genocide, which has continued to be
challenged by extremist Hutu revisionism. 30
In order to expedite prosecution and retroactively correct civil rights viola-
tions that occurred, the Rwandan government enacted Organic Law 9/96, which
took effect on April 6, 1994."' Organic Law 9/96 provided that individuals
who were arrested before its enactment were to have an arrest record created,
with an arrest warrant issued by December 31, 1997, and the opportunity to
appear before a judge within ninety days of the issuance of the arrest warrant. 312
Individuals detained after the enactment of Organic Law 9/96 were to have an
arrest warrant issued within four months of their actual arrest, and were to ap-
pear before a judge within three months after the warrant had been issued.313
However, the deadlines were unrealistic, and were eventually extended by the
Rwandan government effectively providing little benefit to the tens of thousands
of detainees being held without case files for years after the genocide ended. 
3 14
Given Rwanda's lack of success in expediting the justice process, releasing
prisoners became the next solution to overcrowding in the prisons.31 Despite
widespread public protest and cries from genocide survivors' organizations, by
June 15, 1999, 3,365 pre-trial detainees of the ten thousand promised had been
released.316 The release proved to be a poor solution, however, because those
who were released from detention were often targets of violent acts of retribu-
tion, causing some individuals to seek refuge back in prison, and making reinte-
gration difficult for others.31 7
Given the demanding caseload, the difficulty in expediting the traditional
justice system, and the violence accompanying the release of prisoners, on Oc-
tober 17, 1998 the Rwandan president, in consultation with Rwandan officials
and citizens, established a Commission chaired by the Minister of Justice to
investigate increasing public participation in the justice process.318 On June 8,
309. Organic Law No. 8/96, supra note 5, at Art. 19.
310. See VANDEGINSTE, supra note 292, at 3-4; see also Shabas, supra note 139, at 539.
311. VANDEGINSTE, supra note 292, at 9.
312. Drumbl, supra note 243, at 574.
313. Id.
314. See id.
315. Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation
of Human Rights in Rwanda, Michel Moussalli, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 116(c), at 30,
U.N. Doc. A/55/59 (2000) (hereinafter "Report of the Special Representative").
316. VANDEGINSTE, supra note 292, at 9.
317. Report of the Special Representative, supra note 274.
318. VANDEG1NSTE, supra note 292, at 1.
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1999, the Commission published a proposal for gacaca.31 9 The government's
plan called for the creation of more than ten thousand gacaca tribunals, com-
posed of ordinary citizens, to operate in each of Rwanda's 12 prefectures, 145
communes, 1,531 secteurs, and 8,987 cellules.3 2' The government's proposal
provided for approximately one hundred eight thousand citizens to sit as judges
on the tribunals at the cellule level, thirty thousand to sit as judges at the secteur
level, and two thousand to sit as judges at the commune level.3 2 ' The goals of
the new system included "establish[ing] the truth about what happened, with the
communities which were the eye witnesses of the crime giving witness about the
crimes," fighting impunity by punishing genocide-related crimes, and promoting
national reconciliation by achieving "reintegration into society" of the guilty
322parties.
The gacaca draft legislation drew comment and criticism from human
rights activists, lawyers' groups, and academics over the decrease in the scope of
human rights protection it afforded.3 23 The fact that lay gacaca judges could
subject defendants to further imprisonment was an additional concern.3 24 Fur-
ther, victims' rights organizations were worried that any abbreviation in the
justice system would trivialize the seriousness of the crime of genocide.3 25 Not-
withstanding the criticisms, following the conference the Rwandan Ministry of
Justice prepared legislation carrying out the recommendations made at the con-
ference. 2 The gacaca law was passed on January 26, 200 1.327 With the adop-
tion of the gacaca process, the government developed three main goals: (1) to
reduce the number of trials, (2) to encourage people to come forward and testify
319. Id.
320. Leah Werchick, Prospects for Justice in Rwanda's Citizen Tribunals, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF
(Fall 2000), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/08/3rwanda.cfm (citing "Gacaca
Tribunals Vested With Jurisdiction Over Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and Other Violations
of Human Rights which Took Place in Rwanda from 1 October 1990 to 31 December 1994," a
publication released by the Rwandan government in July 1999).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See generally Sarkin, supra note 285, at 159.
324. Werchick, supra note 320.
325. Press Release, Amnesty International USA, Rwanda: The Troubled Course Of Justice,
News Service: 075/00, Al Index: AFR 47/15/00 (April 26, 2000), (hereinafter "Rwanda: The Trou-
bled Course of Justice") available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2000/14701500.htm; Prose-
cuting Genocide in Rwanda: The Gacaca System and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, (hereinafter "Rwanda: The Gacaca System and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda") Report by The Norwegian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Report 11/2002, p. 21
(2002).
326. See generally Shabas, supra note 139, at 530.
327. Organic Law No. 40/2000 of January 26, 2001, Setting Up Gacaca Jurisdictions and
Organizing Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Hu-
manity Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, (hereinafter "Organic Law
40/2000) available at http://www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/ORGANIC%20LAW%20NO%2040.htm.
The statute entered into force on January 26, 2001. Id.
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about events in order to facilitate other prosecutions, and (3) to enhance the
process of reconciliation in the country.328
GACACA DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICALITIES
Would the state of Rwanda have chosen a gacaca system if there were
enough resources to pursue a more Westernized version of due process? If the
government had enough money, it would have pursued a traditional trial system.
However, a traditional justice system would not have achieved what gacaca will
achieve.
-Johnson Busingye, Office of the Prosecutor General329
The gacaca system was one of many alternatives considered when the
country of Rwanda began discussions about resolution of the criminal cases
pending after the genocide.33 ° The dialogue surrounding how to best conduct
the genocide prosecutions was difficult because of the large number of people
who committed genocidal acts.33' Up to one million people were killed in the
genocide.332 Of the remaining seven million citizens, over one hundred thirty
thousand were imprisoned for crimes related to the genocide.333 Some argued
that defendants, particularly genocidaires and those accused of human rights
violations, should be subject to the most severe punishment available under the
law, as a deterrent to future atrocities.334 Others argued that a punitive emphasis
would hinder the effort for reconciliation, as virtually every family and commu-
nity were implicated in the violence, and because the Hutus who were subject to
extreme punishment would feel further isolated from the new Rwandan govern-
ment.335 Because of the need to address social issues as well as prosecute geno-
cide cases, and because of the shortfall in funding for traditional legal institu-
tions of developed countries, the government decided to use Rwanda's historic
customary dispute resolution system, gacaca, to design an alternative justice
program, rather than following the traditional Western prosecutorial system for
genocide trials.336
328. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 276.
329. Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. KEANE, supra note 10, at 29.
333. Amnesty International Rwanda Report 1998 (covering January through December 1997),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar98/afr47.htm.
334. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269; Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
335. Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
336. Nsenga Speech, supra note 5.
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In summary, the practical need to introduce gacaca jurisdictions was based
on the following factors: (1) the need for community involvement in the justice
process; (2) the need to capitalize on the unity of Rwandans; (3) the need to
respond to the psychological aspects of the genocide, which the classical justice
system is not structured to address; (4) the need to create a basis for future rec-
onciliation; (5) the need to ease administrative strains on the classical judicial
system. 3
The involvement of all Rwandan citizens in the gacaca process encourages
unity based on a shared history of customary laws, principles, and procedures,
which were part of a shared heritage and continued to be practiced in different
ways even after the colonial and post-independence phases. 338 Because the im-
plementation of gacaca was so delayed, the opportunity for early reconciliation
was not realized. The delay should be considered a great opportunity lost. Both
parties have had almost ten years to develop stronger positions and biases, rein-
forcing negative stereotypes and fostering anger toward the other group. How-
ever, despite the delay in implementation, gacaca educators are finding that the
education process is becoming more effective, and that citizens are beginning to
respect the institution of gacaca.339 Although there is the possibility that a pub-
lic airing of the facts of the 1994 genocide will further aggravate ethnic tensions,
leading to revenge killings of defendants, victims, and witnesses, the hope is that
as Rwandan communities become engaged in and gain control of the new
gacaca system, the process of reconciliation can begin. 34
The gacaca system is an attempt to address the aforementioned concerns,
because rather than focusing on the mandates and rigid structure of international
criminal law, gacaca provides a way for Rwandans to "learn to deal with our
past."'34' As conceived by Mr. Busingye, learning to deal with the past is the
method through which Rwanda can build a future.3 42 As a transformative or
restorative model of justice, gacaca will address more than individual disputes
or cases.343 The goal of gacaca, as of restorative justice, is to increase social
cohesion and address broad social issues in order to repair the social fabric.34
By placing power in the hands of communities instead of professional jurists,
social relationships stand a better chance of being reconciled, even after a trau-
matic event such as the mass genocide that occurred throughout Rwanda.3 45
337. Nantulya, supra note 20.
338. Id.
339. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
340. Nsenga Speech, supra note 5.
341. Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
342. Id.
343. Pearl Eliadis, New Paths to Justice: Instruments for Resolving Confict, 6 POLICY
RESEARCH INIATIVE, available at http://policyresearch.gc.ca/page.asp?pagenm-v6nl art_16.
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Restorative justice focuses on the settlement of conflicts arising from crime and
the resolution of the underlying causal problems, recognizing the community, in
addition to the criminal justice system, as a forum for crime control.3 46 The
development of knowledge and understanding of the past requires a process
distinct from one dealing with the past in the context of punishment. Gacaca is
the answer to that requirement.347
At the same time, however, a restorative model of justice such as gacaca
cannot be concerned only with repairing the social fabric and creating cohesion
because reconciliation cannot be achieved unless those responsible for genocide
crimes are brought to justice.348 But, in applying Rwandan law, punishment
becomes an issue because, if convicted, thousands of people would be sentenced
to death for committing premeditated murder during the genocide.3 49 Given that
the vast majority of people imprisoned for genocide crimes are Hums, the cur-
rent Tutsi-run government can not impose the death sentence on thousands of
Hutu genocidaires without reinforcing the ethnic divisions that the government
is attempting to diminish.35 ° The reinforcement of ethnic divisions is not condu-
cive to the reconciliation that is one of the primary goals of the Rwandan gov-
ernment.' In theory, gacaca will be effective in meeting the victims' need to
see those responsible for violations brought to justice while addressing and
hopefully narrowing the divisions that already exist and that will be reopened
through testimony at trial.352
The government hopes that gacaca can strike the balance between punish-
ment and reconciliation in most cases.353 However, gacaca will not replace the
existing judicial system, as the government's gacaca program is a community
dispute resolution program for accused genocidaires with lesser degrees of re-
sponsibility in the genocide.1 4 The formal court system will prosecute those
accused of Category 1 crimes, while the aim of gacaca is to support the existing
system and to compensate for its weaknesses.355
As mentioned earlier, gacaca employs a pleading system, a system aimed at
encouraging offenders to confess, apologize, and provide evidence or testimony
346. Eliadis, supra note 343.
347. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
348. Id.
349. Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
353. Id.
354. Werchick, supra note 320.
355. Nantulya, supra note 20.
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against other suspects, in exchange for substantially reduced sentences. 356 One
obvious drawback to the pleading process is that those accused may confess and
apologize without truly feeling remorse. The counterpoint is that, although the
apologies may lack true remorse, many of the accused have already served ten
years in prison, longer than what many international statutes allow for convic-
tions for similar crimes. Furthermore, there are social service agencies to ensure
that those who are released from custody become reintegrated, so that the of-
fender will be watched carefully for recidivist behavior.
357
Another drawback to the pleading program is that some genocidaires will
not admit to crimes if they think there were no witnesses or that there is no evi-
dence to link them to the crimes. As Mr. Busingye said, "human nature is to not
disclose what you think no one else knows. '358 Under a social science rubric
this policy is not inconsistent with a theory of reconciliation, as Mr. Busingye
says, because a genocidaire may be equally haunted by a crime that he will not
admit to having committed.359
The aforementioned theoretical and practical issues weighed heavily in the
decision of how to proceed with the genocide trials.36 ° Even if the fledgling
government had the resources to handle the large volume of trials through a
traditional Western criminal system that focuses on the goal of punishment, a
Western criminal justice system would not address the essential issues of unity
and reconciliation.36" ' The Rwandan government determined, and continues to
feel, that these issues are important to Rwanda's continued growth, and ensure
that the conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsis does not return to violence.
As Mr. Busingye said, in Rwanda, there is a commonly heard saying that, al-
though there is little hope for reconciling adult Hutus and Tutsis today, their
children will play together, and their grandchildren will be fiiends.362
356. Organic Law No. 8/96, supra note 5, at Arts. 4-9. Category I suspects are not able to avail
themselves of reduced sentencing for confession. Id. at Art. 5. Suspects in Category II may attempt
to receive a reduced sentence of seven to fifteen years imprisonment for confession and implication.
Id. at Arts. 15-16. Suspects who do not confess and implicate others will face life imprisonment if
found guilty. Id. at Art. 14. Category III suspects may also seek drastically reduced sentences, even
one-half to one-third of the full sentence. Id. at Arts. 5, 15-16.
357. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
358. Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 296. Mr. Busingye characterized the debate as one involving complex issues such as
unity, history, reconciliation, punishment, and eradication of the culture of impunity that has histori-
cally surrounded genocide crimes. Id.
361. Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
362. Id. As Mr. Busingye noted, evidence of the success of the government's education efforts
can be found in a visit to a Rwandan school, where, if asks children to which tribe they belong, the
majority will not know the answer: today, it is much more difficult to get Rwandan school children
to name one another or themselves as Hutu or Tutsi.
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IMPLEMENTATION OF GACACA
The government's gacaca is designed to operate throughout the country.363
The stages of the gacaca process include: (1) election of judges; (2) information
gathering; (3) categorization of genocidaires; (4) trials. Each community has
already elected judges from among the members of the community, and the
information gathering and categorization phases are nearly complete.3 " Cate-
gory I defendants' cases are forwarded to the Rwandan conventional prosecu-
tor's office, while gacaca tribunals have jurisdiction over all Category 2, 3, and
4 offenses.365
The gacaca process begins at the cellule (or "cell") level, where the entire
adult population of an area constitutes the "council." '366 The council, made up of
ordinary citizens, provides the initial investigation of all genocide suspects in the
community and formally classifies the accused into categories."' The council
also elects the cellule level gacaca "court" and "coordination council." '368 The
court will be responsible for issuing decisions and the coordination council will
direct the court's activities."' The trial process will begin with the cellule
gacaca tribunals trying suspects accused of Category 4 crimes, and passing the
dossiers on more serious offenders up to the next level gacaca structure.37 The
process will be repeated, with the secteur (or "sector") level tribunals trying the
Category 3 cases, and passing along the more serious dossiers to the commune
tribunals trying the Category 2 cases.3 ' The prefecture level controls and coor-
dinates activities at the commune jurisdictional level.372 The gacaca plan does
not provide for Western-style appeals, although secteur and commune level
gacaca decisions may be appealed to the next-highest gacaca tribunal.373 This
limitation on the appeals process provides a level of finality to judgments that
will in turn speed the process.
363. Nantulya, supra note 20.
364. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
365. Werchick, supra note 320.
366. Id.
367. See id.; see also Nantulya, supra note 20. The process of investigation includes receiving
accusations and testimony from citizens, and drawing up lists of alleged victims and accused. Nan-
tulya, supra note 20.
368. Werchick, supra note 320.
369. Id.
370. See id.; see also Nantulya, supra note 20.
371. See Werchick, supra note 320; see also Nantulya, supra note 20.
372. Nantulya, supra note 20.
373. Werchick, supra note 320.
39
39
Raper: The Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda's Restorative Dispute Resolution Re
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2004
Gacaca tribunals are vested with the legal authority of both the Rwandan
courts and prosecutor's office, including the powers to: summon any person to
appear and testify, issue warrants, conduct searches, attach personal goods, and
impose sentences up to and including life imprisonment.374 Those who partici-
pate in the program to confess and plead guilty will be eligible for greater reduc-
tions in sentences than currently exist under conventional Rwandan law, and
may even opt for substituting community service for prison time.375
Despite Rwanda's progress toward instituting gacaca trials, there are still
significant hurdles to be overcome. Fortunately, the publicity and educational
programs that developed prior to the commencement of the trial process have
already delivered significant social benefits. For example, the process is coun-
terbalancing Rwandan fears of a continued culture of impunity that is based on
continued charges of excessive force by the RPF in seeking out extremist
groups.376 As a result, citizens are expressing more faith in the Rwandan gov-
ernment by participating in the process.377
ANALYSIS OF GACACA
Geraldine Umugwaneza, a Judge and Counselor in the Department of
Gacaca Jurisdictions and one of the Rwandan government's most valuable
grassroots educators who is helping gacaca to become an institutionalized en-
tity, feels that, although the gacaca education process is showing some progress,
one of the most difficult hurdles gacaca still faces in the international commu-
nity is the fact that the West generally does not expect effective African solu-
tions for African problems-that the Western perception is that "nothing good
can come from Africa." '378 By the same token, Western legal analysis of gacaca
often compares the system to Western criminal justice theory and finds gacaca
lacking.379 Exercises comparing gacaca to Western trial models are, of course,
valuable in the comparative law and human rights contexts. This article is a
discussion of gacaca in the context of international standards for alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) processes, in order to determine whether this ADR
process meets the standards for an ADR mechanism. This type of analysis is
.relatively rare, even in the ADR field.38 In fact, ADR research has tended to
374. Id.
375. Id; see also Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
376. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. See, e.g. Werchick, supra note 320; Rwanda: The Troubled Course of Justice, supra note
329.
380. Eliadis, supra note 343.
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focus on economic issues, at least in the context of litigation, while compara-
tively little has been done in conflict resolution focused on social issues.3"'
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION BACKGROUND
ADR has been a complementary form of solving disputes for as long as in-
stitutional dispute resolution processes have existed.382 Shortcomings in formal
litigation have resulted in formal and informal dispute resolution forums for
alternative processes now known under the mantle of ADR.38 3 Litigation is
adversarial, formal, and inflexible, with often cumbersome and complex sub-
stantive and procedural rules. Traditional customary dispute resolution, how-
ever, allows an almost unlimited amount of flexibility.38 4 While dispute resolu-
tion methods are flexible in design such that multiple processes may be used in
each forum, the processes all function as valid alternatives to more formal legal
systems.385
One of the chief benefits of ADR is that countries are able to adapt proc-
esses flexibly to resolve disputes using mechanisms that maintain the "cohesion,
economic and political stability of the state." '386 In developed countries, dispute
resolution participants are able to choose among multiple dispute resolution
forums, picking the dispute resolution method that best suits the parties'
needs. 387 However, many African countries have not developed institutionalized
ADR process, instead relying on the traditional African system of dispute reso-
lution.388
In consideration of the aforementioned issues, Rwanda has created a gov-
ernmental process based on Rwanda's traditional gacaca system, that combines
elements of mediation, arbitration, and conciliation processes. Mediation is a
process through which the parties are guided to design their own solution to
their dispute. 389 Arbitration allows the parties to appoint a neutral who hears the
parties' arguments and makes an independent decision based on legal, equitable,
or hybrid considerations.390 Conciliation is a method through which a neutral
381. Id.
382. Owasanoye, supra note 286.
383. Id.
384. See generally Owasanoye, supra note 286 (citing the Nigerian case: Lewis v. Bankole, I
N.L.R 81,100 (1908)).
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discusses the dispute with the parties and then prepares a binding or non-binding
solution based on the conciliator's recommendation for a just compromise.39" '
The conciliator attempts to satisfy the parties, hoping to achieve consensus with
the suggested solution.392 Gacaca takes elements from these existing processes:
the parties are encouraged to, as in conciliation, talk out their positions and, as in
mediation, make a case for an outcome and resolve their differences in a com-
promise solution that is, as in arbitration, rendered as a decision by a third party.
These more modem forms of institutionalized ADR, mediation, arbitration, and
conciliation, are merely nomenclature used to describe part of the gacaca proc-
ess, which is based on Rwanda's fully-developed traditional dispute resolution
system.
INSTITUTIONALIZED STRUCTURE
Gacaca relies on community participation, as well as neutrals who consider
gacaca law, customary rules of law, as well as equitable factors, such as historic
and interpersonal issues, in coming to decisions with the goal of restoring social
harmony.39 3 Although participation in the government's gacaca system is more
formalized than the historic process, the historic system was, to some extent, just
as compulsory, in that there were potent sanctions in the form of social ostra-
cism if parties did not participate in the system or comply with decisions. To-
day's gacaca is an ADR attempt to rescue Rwandan society from one of the
main causes of the genocide, which was "community disintegration and suspi-
cion between the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa communities, due to divisive policies and
a state ideology which sought to categorise these communities as ethnically and
racially distinct, despite the fact that they all share one ethnicity, one language
and a common heritage." '394 Like Western ADR processes, gacaca offers con-
ventional advantages compared to developed countries' trial models, such as
being less expensive, quicker, and more flexible than litigation, and also allow-
ing the parties to work toward a long-term relationship or reconciliation. Be-
cause gacaca is an institutionalized branch of the Rwandan government, gacaca
has become less flexible than the traditional dispute resolution process, due to
standardization and formalization of the gacaca process.395 Obviously, some
level of standardization and formalization of process is required for decisions to
have any meaning outside the context of the forum that made the decision.
However, gacaca administrators are charged with balancing the need for flexi-
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
394. Nantulya, supra note 20, available at http://www.accord.org.za.
395. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
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bility with the goal of ensuring a perception of fairness of the process, in order
to assist in rebuilding citizens' trust in the Rwandan government.
396
While governmental involvement presents some costs and some benefits to
the implementation of gacaca, the involvement provides a model for other coun-
tries that are attempting transformative justice programs. For example, Western
governments are coming to recognize that the Western approach does not al-
ways serve victims and the community, not to mention defendants, because of
the Western system's complexity and the failure of the process to attempt to
foster reconciliation between the parties. These formal systems may "leave
some victims powerless and emphasize guilt rather than individual responsibility
toward community." '397 The Law Commission of Canada's research and studies
have determined that a justice system structured to deal with the issues of com-
plexity and reconciliation has a greater "potential to foster moral growth and
transform society by enabling wider participation in the process of justice."
Rwanda's governmental involvement should aid the development of reconcilia-
tion theory, as the process is analyzed as a model for other countries.398 Al-
though Rwanda's process seems experimental in the extreme when compared to
the Western trial process, the gacaca system, in theory, is not so removed from
the scenarios described by the Law Commission of Canada.
CATEGORIZATION ISSUES
Some defendants' crimes are difficult to categorize, because both the
Rwandan criminal law and the gacaca law are incomplete. One relevant exam-
ple is the Rwandan rape statute, which defines rape using the bare legal conclu-
sion that rape is "unlawful sexual intercourse." '399 The Rwandan Penal Code
does not define "unlawful sexual intercourse" and, therefore, is, for all practical
purposes, silent on the elements of the crime of rape. 4°° Further, the law of rape
is incomplete because the Rwandan Penal Code defines rape as requiring penile
penetration, but it does not, for example, specifically proscribe crimes related to
forced sodomy, oral or digital penetration, or penetration with a foreign object of
either a man or a woman. 41 The gacaca law on rape is similarly uninforma-
tive.42 As a result of lack of clarity in the law, even trained prosecutors do not
396. Id.
397. Eliadis, supra note 343.
398. Id.
399. Rwandan Penal Code, Article 360
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Organic Law 40/2000, supra note 327.
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agree on the appropriate categorization for crimes.4"3 Further, because the
gacaca judges are lay people, inexperienced at applying the facts to the law and
unfamiliar with comparative law systems, vaguely written statutes generate even
further confusion.
In addition to legal issues such as vagueness of Rwandan statute, a common
problem that has arisen in the process of categorizing defendants' crimes pursu-
ant to gacaca law is that often witnesses do not give complete information, be-
cause investigators do not ask the right questions or do not have enough training
on how to deal with victims appropriately. 4" These issues may lead to incom-
plete dossiers and case files and could lead to inaccurate categorization of de-
fendants' crimes.4 5
Another administrative problem regarding categorization of genocide
crimes involves the investigators' tracing of genocidaires' crimes throughout the
country of Rwanda.4"6 According to the gacaca statute, a genocidaire is to be
tried once, for all crimes committed, at the cell where he committed the most
serious crime.40 7 However, often, genocidaires committed crimes in different
cellular jurisdictions under assumed or different names.4"8 Gacaca investigators
must link the crimes to the proper defendants, and the gacaca courts must decide
where the most serious crimes occurred and, thus, where defendants should be
tried.40 9 The Rwandan government is presently designing a computer program
to cross-reference defendants by name, alias, and categorization for different
crimes committed to ease the jurisdiction search.4"' Despite the aforementioned
issues, the information gathering and categorization phases are nearly complete.
Buy-IN AND ACCEPTANCE
The gacaca trial process will involve bringing together the victim, victim's
family members, defendant, defendant's family members, and any witnesses, all
of whom will publicly testify in front of the gacaca judges.41" ' This part of the
gacaca process will be highly publicized, and the Rwandan government antici-
pates a high level of community participation and attendance at the gacaca tri-
als.4"2 After the trial process is completed, the gacaca judges will give their
403. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
404. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Organic Law 40/2000, supra note 327.
408. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
409. Id.
410. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
411. Organic Law 40/2000, supra note 327, at Art. 69-7 1.
412. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
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decision.4"3 If a guilty verdict is reached, the defendant will be sentenced to
participate in reintegration counseling, community service, or another program
that the judges deem appropriate, and released.414 The trial process is dependent
upon the parties' agreement to participate in the process, or "buy in" to the proc-
ess.
The essential requirement in any initiation of ADR is an agreement between
the parties to participate in the process, commonly known as "buy-in." Ideally,
the parties' buy-in should occur before the process begins, although parties may
make the decision to begin participation while holding mental reservations. In
the case of gacaca, the primary parties include defendants and victims. Secon-
dary, but equally important, parties include witnesses, the families of the defen-
dants and victims, and community members. Because the gacaca process is
beginning with a grassroots investigation process prior to the commencement of
the trial process, the government has had the time to conduct an extensive edu-
cation campaign."1 Buy-in is beginning to occur, as the government's programs
convince more and more citizens that the gacaca trials will occur, will be fair,
and will not be corrupt.416 Genocidaires are beginning to file the papers, admit-
ting the crimes they have committed and detailing the crimes of others. Gerald-
ine Umugwaneza, a gacaca judge/trainer, has found that,
[c]itizens are now realizing that there is no prescription period, or statute of limitations for the
genocide crimes. People are coming to realize that, if they do not want to live haunted, they
must come forward and confess to their crimes. Some people are choosing to get it over with,
and confess to their crimes now. We are continuing to educate people with the phrase that it
is "not a favor to speak out, it is an obligation."
4 17
Because the historic gacaca process is locally recognized, even Rwandans who
have lived in exile for many years are familiar with the government's system.
Rwandans tend to be familiar with gacaca or similar processes. Familiarity may
also be based on similarity in African customary dispute resolution programs.4
Thus, now that citizens are buying in to the gacaca process, understanding of
the process is more accessible than would be a Westernized trial process because
the system has some foundation in people's lives.419
According to Mr. Busingye, over time, the Rwandan people are learning to
respect gacaca, in that there is increasing honesty among witnesses and victims
413. Organic Law 40/2000, supra note 327, at Art. 69-71.
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419. Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
45
45
Raper: The Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda's Restorative Dispute Resolution Re
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2004
who are coming forward to participate in the process.42 ° Although there is no
measurable way to assess the effectiveness and growth in community acceptance
of gacaca, administrators are finding that there is increased participation in the
gacaca process, as demonstrated by the following example described by Ms.
Umugwaneza:
In October of 2001, Rwandan citizens elected gacaca judges. In June of 2002, almost a year
after the elections, the same people who helped to elect the gacaca judges named some of the
judges as genocidaires in the gacaca information gathering process. As a result, there are al-
legations that some of the elected judges were genocide perpetrators and were known by the
community to have committed these crimes, even at the time that the gacaca elections were
conducted. Genocidaires were elected to be impartial judges, in part because from 1975 on-
wards, crimes such as genocide were not punished, and therefore had not been commonly
thought of as crimes. As a result, people did not believe that the process would come to exist,
or was a real process, or would be enforced, and certainly did not think that the gacaca proc-
ess would be fair in prosecuting community leaders. Thus, these same leaders were elected
judges.
4 21
As evidenced by the participation in the information gathering process by the
naming of judges as perpetrators, citizens are beginning to buy in to the process,
demonstrating more faith in and commitment to gacaca and to the Rwandan
government. 422 As Rwanda's government seeks buy-in of the gacaca process,
there have been tangential social benefits, such as the beginning of the healing
process, that have occurred because of the publicity and educational programs
developed precedent to the commencement of the trial process. 423
MITIGATING FACTORS
Action with impunity became part of the culture in Rwanda, at least in part,
because the pre-genocide and genocide-era Rwandan governments promised that
there would never be prosecution of genocidaires.424 Further, relatively few
Rwandans would be considered innocent of genocidal acts because the state
took great pains at the community level to systematically involve as many citi-
zens as possible in the genocide. 425 Through a well-executed and comprehen-
sive program of enticement and pressure - even up to the killing of citizens'
family members - the extremist government ensured that as many citizens as
possible participated in the genocide. 426 By way of illustration, there is even a
Rwandan maxim that, at the time of the genocide, "everyone killed, even if they
420. Id.
421. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
422. Id.
423. Id.; Eliadis, supra note 343.
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were living out of the country. 4 27 Mr. Busingye estimates that perhaps half of
the genocidaires in prison are those who succumbed to government pressure in
committing genocidal acts.4 28 The gacaca process allows for the identification
of those who killed easily, as opposed to those who were forced by intense pres-
sure to kill, and allows for mitigation based on the legal climate at the time of
the genocide.4 29 Mr. Busingye argues that at the beginning of the genocide,
genocidaires acted with greater moral culpability, and in a sense more crimi-
nally, because their actions were not only illegal, but also outside the scope of
accepted social norms.43 However, as the genocide progressed, it became clear
that the government was becoming more and more successful with its program
of killing.4 3' Because no one was prosecuted, genocide was normalized, and the
program's success created a culture of impunity. 432 The culture of impunity
allowed people to have no fear of reprisal for their crimes, and to easily con-
vince themselves that what they were doing did not violate social norms and had
no consequences under the law.433 Gacaca allows the judges to take a defen-
dant's explanation of the institutionalized culture of genocide into consideration
when rendering a decision and sentence.434
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
Despite the opportunity for defendants to show mitigating factors during
gacaca trials, and the fact that, if a defendant participates in the pleading proce-
dure, gacaca offers immediate release of a genocidaire even if convicted, the
process has drawn justifiable comment and criticism from human rights activ-
ists, lawyers' groups, and academics over the decrease in the scope of due proc-
ess and human rights protection. 435 For example, Amnesty International remains
concerned that the issue of reconciliation could overshadow the question of
innocence or guilt of the accused, raising the following human rights considera-
tions:
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those judging these extremely complex and serious cases will have no legal training or may
have a personal interest in the verdict, thus potentially undermining the competence, inde-
pendence and impartiality of these courts;
fundamental aspects of the gacaca proposals do not conform to basic international standards
for fair trials guaranteed in international treaties which Rwanda has ratified .... 436
As Amnesty International notes, the gacaca process excludes the use of at-
torneys on either side, raising human rights accountability issues related to the
fairness and quality of legal defense. 437 Further, gacaca judges will be able to
avoid difficult defense issues, both factual and legal, because there are no de-
fense attorneys to raise the issues.43 8 As a result, if root causes of problems are
ignored, this will hinder the reconciliation effort. However, although the gacaca
system is not generally compliant with international criminal law human rights
standards, the system strikes a balance between responsiveness to the interests of
the Rwandan community, and respect of individual human rights.439 Gacaca is
a process that is accessible to citizens and the lay judges who are becoming edu-
cated to decide often complex equitable matters. As a practical point of com-
parison, the warehousing of Rwandan accused genocidaires in highly substan-
dard conditions for up to ten years is a gross violation of human rights. 44  Fur-
ther, the current backlog in the Rwandan justice Amnesty system and the prison
conditions constitute serious violations of numerous internationally protected
human rights."' Gacaca responds to these problems by allowing judges to re-
lease prisoners as soon as the verdict is given. 442 Further, the verdict wiil be
rendered much more quickly than would be given through a Western-style
trial. 443 The only option for a quicker release of prisoners, a general amnesty
and release, was attempted and found to be extremely destabilizing."4 Former
prisoners often became victims of revenge violence and some even took refuge
back in the prisons."4 United Nations screening committees that meant to re-
436. Rwanda: The Troubled Course Of Justice, supra note 325.
437. Rwanda: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002, Released by the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (March 31, 2003), available at
http://www.nationbynation.com/Rwanda/Human.html.
438. Id.
439. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
440. Rwanda: The Troubled Course of Justice, supra note 325.
441. See generally Rwanda: The Troubled Course of Justice, supra note 325; see also Human
Rights Watch, The Search for Security and Human Rights Abuses, vol. 12, no. 1, (Apr. 2000) (dis-
cussing silencing the press, extra judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and torture), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/rwanda/ [hereinafter Search for Security]. As purely a practical
matter, today many families make weekly journeys, often over great distances, to provide supple-
mental food and basic necessities for family members in prison awaiting trial. (citation necessary)
442. Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
443. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
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view files and, ultimately, to release prisoners, were found to be ineffective." 6
Gacaca is meant to allow for the release of prisoners by providing an element of
punishment in order to satisfy victims' need for justice, while also fostering a
sense of reconciliation." 7
Again, on a purely a practical note, although human rights criticisms are
completely valid, for a country such as Rwanda that has very limited resources
to spend on protecting civil rights and political freedoms, these necessities must
sometimes bow to other important issues also crying out for attention." 8 As a
result of the lack of resources, civil rights and political freedoms cannot be guar-
anteed in the same way in Rwanda as these rights may be protected in a wealthy
country, despite Rwanda's best intentions, or treaty obligations, or pressure from
the international community." As a result, any analysis of the Rwandan legal
system must address the reality that, theory notwithstanding, Rwanda's options
for resolving the genocide cases were and remain extremely limited.450
SOCIAL COHESION
The gacaca system requires the judges and participants to mix the classical
Westem justice system's goal of punishment with the reconciliation goals of the
traditional Rwandan system.451 Reconciliation is expected to occur, in part,
because one of the main functions of historic gacaca was to maintain social
cohesion. 52 The flexibility of gacaca enabled the judges to fashion decisions
that both satisfied the parties and strengthened the social fabric of the commu-
nity.453 In the same sense, the Rwandan government's modem gacaca program
is charged with developing social cohesion in Rwanda, in situations such as the
following, relayed by Ms. Umugwaneza:
A woman and her first husband have children. In 1994, the woman's first husband commits
genocide crimes and is subsequently imprisoned for those crimes. While the woman's first
husband is in prison, the woman falls in love with and marries someone from the family of a
victim of her first husband's crimes. The woman and her second husband have children. The
446. Amnesty International Report, Rwanda: A Question of Justice (December 17, 2002),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr470072002.
447. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
448. Shabas, supra note 139.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
452. See generally Owasanoye, supra note 286; Nantuyla, supra note 20, at 53.
453. VANDEGINSTE, supra note 292, at 15.
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woman and her second husband have care of their children, as well as the children of the
woman and her first husband.
454
The gacaca judges are faced with responsibility for consideration of the
unity of the two families, the family of the imprisoned genocidaire and the fam-
ily of the victim, as well as the woman and her mixed family. 455 Each panel of
gacaca judges is expected to work together to find creative solutions to difficult
problems such as the one described above.456 Although the governmental for-
malization of the process will make the judges more accountable for their deci-
sions, the formalization also eliminates some of the flexibility that was endemic
in the traditional gacaca process. 457 However, institutionalization of the creative
process, through charging gacaca judges with finding creative solutions, is an
attempt to duplicate the value of historic process that was successful in main-
taining social cohesion.455
LAY PANEL OF NEUTRALS
In contrast to Rwanda's gacaca ADR system, in a traditional Westernized
dispute resolution process, the parties have the option to select the neutral who
will be the decision-maker for the parties' case. 459  As described above, in
gacaca, a panel of judges is selected from among members of the community
and is elected to handle all gacaca cases for that geographical area." The
gacaca judges are elected in a process similar to judicial election in Western
law. 4
61
The fact that a panel of judges sits on every gacaca matter is a great advan-
tage for the gacaca process.462 If only one judge were assigned to a matter, the
judge would wield a tremendous amount of power over individual defendants,
victims and witnesses. 63 If only one judge were assigned to a matter, especially
in a poor country such as Rwanda, where the judges are not well paid, an indi-
vidual judge would be more susceptible to bribery or coercion than a group of
judges.4' The use of multiple gacaca judges in each case makes it far less
likely that any case will be unfairly or improperly decided.465
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One fundamental human rights principle is the requirement of the impartial-
ity of the neutral and the impartiality of the dispute resolution process.466 The
gacaca plan does not follow this restriction, instead seeking to involve some of
the parties, even genocide victims, in the process as both neutrals and investiga-
tors.467 The gacaca process requires every unincarcerated Rwandan citizen to
serve on the gacaca council at the cellule level, where citizens are tasked with
gathering evidence and categorizing cases. 461 The sheer number of judges in the
gacaca process, comprising approximately one percent of the population, threat-
ens defendants' right to an impartial neutral.4 69 With such a large percentage of
the population elected as judges, it is not surprising that people who have been
elected as judges are now being named as defendants in the information gather-
ing process, presenting a fundamental fairness issue.47
Further, the selection of lay people as judges requires a good deal of educa-
tion, because many gacaca judges are not familiar with genocide law or geno-
cide because these crime were not proscribed in the Rwandan penal code, and
genocidal acts were not punished, nor even outside of social norms for years
before the genocide occurred.47" ' Although the education of gacaca judges is
proceeding as demonstrated, there are judges who still do not have a full under-
standing of what it means to be a victim of genocide.4"2 Even more troubling,
often, gacaca judges don't know what genocide is. For example, Ms. Umug-
waneza encountered the following situation:
A gacaca judge telephoned Ms. Umugwaneza and said that her help was needed because of
an important problem at a gacaca categorization session. Ms. Umugwaneza travelled to the
session, and listened as the judge relayed the following scenario that took place at the time of
the genocide: a woman died in her home, as a result of hanging. There was no known evi-
dence as to how the hanging had occurred. There was some evidence that known geno-
cidaires were present in the vicinity of the woman's home, but no evidence had been col-
lected that linked the genocidaires to the crime. When the gacaca judges were faced with
whether to continue investigation of the woman's death and whether her death was the result
of genocide, one of the judges suggested, in the presence of the townspeople, that the woman
had "committed genocide on herself." Ms. Umugwaneza did not want to educate the judge in
the presence of the assembled townspeople, and so responded by thanking the judges for their
caring service and saying that, while she could not give a recommendation as to the categori-
466. The requirement of an "independent and impartial tribunal" is also contained in the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 14(1), to which Rwanda acceded on
March 23, 1976.
467. Werchick, supra note 320.
468. Organic Law 40/2000, supra note 327, at Art. 33.
469. Werchick, supra note 320.
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zation, she was sure that the judges would make the right decision. After the assembly had
been dismissed, in order to educate the judge, Ms. Umugwaneza asked whether the woman
would be a victim of genocide under the following hypotheticals, asking, "is this genocide:"
suppose the woman hanged herself to avoid rape and torture by genocidaires
suppose the woman is listed as not having been a victim of genocide, and then later a
genocidaire confesses to her murder
. suppose the woman is killed in an accident, as a genocidaire chases her or someone else
down the road
. suppose the woman hid in the cold to avoid detection by genocidaires, and died because
she could not come inside for fear of retribution or death
. suppose the woman became sick, but could not present herself for treatment for fear of ret-
ribution, and therefore died
473
As a result of the hypotheticals that Ms. Umugwaneza relayed to the judges, the
judges determined that the hanged woman may have been a victim of genocide,
and that the investigation should remain open. With education about genocide
law, the judges and communities are becoming more educated about human
rights and Rwanda's history. This education is the first step toward reconcilia-
tion. In fact, though, the groups are still learning to live together, and are far
from reaching a state of reconciliation.
7 4
PUBLIC EDUCATION
The gacaca process, beginning with charging, and continuing through inves-
tigation, trial, and post-trial follow-up with defendants, is designed to assist in
the creation of an environment conducive to addressing the psychological needs
of individuals, communities, and the society as a whole.475 However, the issues
raised through the education process are often too difficult or traumatizing for
individuals to resolve alone. To assist individuals in dealing with the results of
trauma, the government has founded the National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission (NURC).4 76  The NURC is a public education agency that was
established purely to reunite communities and assist citizens dealing with post-
genocide trauma.4 77 This and other organizations have provided the government
473. Id.
474. Ruth Wedgwood and Harold K. Jacobson, Foreword, Symposium: State Reconstruction
After Civil Conflict, American Journal of International Law, v. 95 (January 2001), published online
at http://www.asil.org/ajil/reconl.htm.
475. Rwanda: The Gacaca System and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra
note 325, at 21.
476. Id. at 14.
477. Id.; Eliadis, supra note 343.
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with another avenue to indirectly support the gacaca and formal justice proc-
esses while working for social change."'
PROTECTION OF VICTIMS AND WITNESSES
Protection of victims and witnesses is a concern in Rwanda because, as of
yet, there is no statute in the Rwandan Penal Code that proscribes bribing,
threatening, intimidating or coercing witnesses or victims of crime.479 Although
the Rwandan government is currently working to enact such legislation in light
of the increased need to protect victims and witnesses who participate in the
gacaca process, victim and witness security remains a concem. 4 0 The Rwan-
dan government has had the benefit of a trial run at dealing with potential
gacaca security issues, due to problems surrounding victim and witness testi-
mony at the ICTR.48' Security of victims and witnesses is an issue that is cur-
rently being addressed in both Rwanda and Arusha, Tanzania, where the ICTR
trials are currently being conducted. 482 Although victims and witnesses may
receive protection when they appear and testify before the ICTR in Arusha (and
some testify anonymously), given the closeness of Rwandan communities, it is
virtually impossible for a citizen to leave Rwanda and travel unnoticed to Tan-
zania. 3 Thus, a citizen's absence and presumed testimony may become the
subject of often-inaccurate gossip, which many victims and witnesses rightly
fear could lead to violent retribution.484 Because Rwandan citizens generally
cannot afford trips to Tanzania to view the proceedings firsthand, the gossip
often has little foundation in truth.485
Although there are secret organizations that ensure that people are protected
after they have testified before the ICTR, these groups cannot be presumed to
protect the vast number of citizens who will be offering simultaneous testimony
when the gacaca trials begin.486 The fear of retribution is exacerbated by the fact
that, as commonly heard in Rwanda, the Hutus and the Tutsis are "barely getting
along. 487
478. Eliadis, supra note 343.
479. Kritz Speech, supra note 267.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda website, General Information, available at
http://www.ictr.org/default.htm.
483. Kritz Speech, supra note 265.
484. Id.
485. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269.
486. Id.
487. Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
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In contrast to the ICTR, the gacaca process will be conducted in the vil-
lages and towns where the victims and witnesses live, drawing strength from
being a public process that is organized to socialize the whole community, and
benefiting those who testify truthfully.488 As a result, harmful gossip that may
follow a citizen's gacaca testimony will, at least, be tinged with the truth of
those who witnessed the gacaca proceedings.
489
CULTURAL ISSUES
Although the gacaca system of holding trials at the grassroots level may
encourage people to testify truthfully about events they witnessed personally
during the genocide, this testimony also may be inhibited when sensitive issues,
such as incidents involving rape or sexual torture, or the torture and murder of a
close family member are concerned. 49 ' Thus, the benefit of truthful testimony is
balanced by the fact that much of the testimony will be about very difficult sub-
jects that the victims and witnesses do not necessarily want to share with the
members of an entire community. ' Given the Rwandan cultural trait of pri-
vacy about personal issues, gacaca trials will often be the first time that many
Rwandan citizens have spoken of the genocide.492 Through educational pro-
grams conducted by the NURC and other organizations, citizens are learning the
psychological benefit of more open discussion.493 Because customary dispute
resolution evolved with a community focus, the process has not historically been
used in cases in which the parties have cultural differences or come from diverse
cultural backgrounds.494 This issue is important in Rwanda given the large
number of exiled citizens who have returned to Rwanda since the end of the
genocide.495 These people, who often lived outside Rwanda for their entire adult
lives, or were even born outside Rwanda, bring cultural diversity issues that
must be considered in the process. 496 Basic issues such as language must also be
considered, as Rwandans living outside Rwanda often speak a different dialect
488. Author's Note: By contrast, generally, one of the most touted benefits of Western dispute
resolution proceedings and decisions is that they are private in nature. However, it is interesting to
note that dispute resolution processes involving broad based social issues such as land use or envi-
ronmental concerns also draw strength from their transparency as public processes.
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of the local language, Kinyarwanda, and speak English rather than French as a
secondary language.497 These citizens are equally important in the process to
become a unified Rwanda, but their cultural mores are often different than those
existing for Rwandans who never left the country.
ENFORCEMENT OF GACACA DECISIONS
The final requirement of an ADR process is that there is a mechanism for
enforcement of the decision. Historically, gacaca provided the norm for dispute
resolution in Rwandan communities, because communities accepted the custom-
ary law of gacaca as binding.498 Gacaca was organized to socialize the whole
community, because the whole society was witness to the decision and provided
enforcement.499 Social exclusion or ostracism provided a potent sanction if a
party did not comply with the decision."° In Rwanda, there have never been,
and there are no ghettos, no state-sponsored living divisions, and no expecta-
tions that Hutus or Tutsis will live in certain areas.5 ' In fact, in there is a Kin-
yarwandan saying that "neighbours give birth to children who look like each
other."50 2 Accordingly, the historic gacaca system was always pan-ethnic, in
that both Hutus and Tutsis are subject to the same community mores and gov-
erned by the same elders. The historic enforceability of decisions is a strength
that lends itself to the government's process today.
As in the past, today's gacaca program provides a public resolution with
community sanction.50 3 Further, the full weight of the Rwandan government is
behind the enforcement of gacaca decisions." ° Government organizations simi-
lar to probation departments and trauma centers will be working together to
reintegrate accused genocidaires into the community and assist genocide vic-
497. Id.
498. Nantulya, supra note 20, at 53; see generally Owasanoye, supra note 286.
499. Oswanoye, supra note 286.
500. Id.
501. Busingye Interview, supra note 294. According to Mr. Busingye: "There now are certain
areas that are predominantly Hutu or Tutsi, due to practical reasons of population movement, not
because of a group's need to settle with others of their group. For example, those who were exiled
in 1959 often left Rwanda and settled just outside the Rwandan border. Upon returning to Rwanda,
these former exiles often settled just inside the Rwandan border, either because the location allowed
for easy flight if necessary, or because the location is not far from where the exiles lived outside the
Rwandan border, or because the location was the first found and easiest to settle. Further, there are
some areas which, today, are majority or all Hutu, because all of the Tutsis living in that area were
killed in the 1994 genocide." Busingye Interview, supra note 296; see also Nantulya, supra note 20.
502. Nantulya, supra note 20.
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tims.5°5 The NURC is also dedicated to working toward community reintegra-
tion.1 6 Further, there is the threat of police enforcement if the gacaca decisions
are not respected. 7 However, the government is faced with a greater task than
merely enforcing a punishment regime - gacaca enforcement also includes stop-
ping the cycle of revenge.5"8 Gacaca is meant to address the issue of defen-
dants, many of whom have been imprisoned for almost ten years, becoming
slowly reintegrated into the Rwandan community - getting reaccustomed to the
village, meeting people, and interacting with villagers who are, in turn, learning
to live with the defendants. °
CONCLUSION
Gacaca is one of the processes that Rwanda is utilizing to respond to the
immediate need to move forward with genocide prosecutions, as well as deal
with the long-term psychosocial need for national reconciliation and unity.
Gacaca reinforces, but is not intended to replace, the formal justice system. As
a system rooted in Rwanda's traditions, gacaca takes advantage of Rwandan
cultural characteristics and capitalizes on a historical unity of the collective
Rwandan experience. Gacaca also gives the Rwandan people an opportunity to
take part in shaping their own country, and is restorative in facilitating commu-
nity reintegration - a process that is seen as necessary in addressing the funda-
mental causes of the genocide. Although there are many benefits and costs to
this uniquely creative judicial experiment, gacaca is an important contribution
to the field of ADR. Gacaca is also an experiment in utilizing traditional or
customary justice processes to address vast peace and reconciliation issues, and
to determine whether customary dispute resolution systems may be adapted by
governments. Gacaca is an important experiment in the field of human rights,
as Rwandan citizens make a proactive attempt to build a better future for the
country through healing the conflict that became one of the largest human rights
catastrophes in world history.
505. Umugwaneza Interview, supra note 269; Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
506. Eliadis, supra note 343.
507. Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
508. Id.
509. Busingye Interview, supra note 294.
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